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25 August 1981

# China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 12/81)



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CHINA REPORT  
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS  
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

YUNNAN DEFENSE REGIMENT SCORES VICTORIES IN BORDER CLASH

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 2 May 79 p 1

[Article by contributing correspondent Qian Gang [6929 6921] and correspondent Sun Haogang [1327 3185 0474]: "Victories in 29 Consecutive Battles in 21 Days-- A New Chapter in the Glorious History of Fighting Written for Certain Border Defense Regiment in Yunnan Province"]

[Text] Carrying forward the glorious tradition of continuous fighting without rest, a certain regiment of the border defense units in Yunnan has won 29 consecutive battles in 21 days. The unit party committee has decided to request the higher authorities to give this regiment a collective Merit Citation, First Class. Fang Yi [2455 3015], head of a Central Comforting Team, personally visited this regiment and lauded it for "fighting well."

This regiment was born during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and has since been distinguished for its courage in battles, particularly for wiping out a Japanese company in a hand-to-hand fighting. In the early stage of the War of Liberation, it intercepted the advance of two Kuomintang brigades at Wanfuhe, where it fought 7 days and won a citation from the commander of the Second Field Army.

In the recent counterattack in self-defense, this regiment was able to fight tough battles against great odds, destroy the enemy by fighting at close range, and make new contributions to the defense of the motherland despite harrowing conditions. On 17 February, this regiment made a two-prong thrust deep into an enemy column after blazing trails through entangled vines and tall grasses with their heavy knives. Led by Capt Deng Tuodian [6772 1122 0368], the company commander, the fighters of the 4th Company, which had engaged in bayonet combat with the Japanese aggressors, rolled downhill for tens of feet with their combat gear. They climbed six high mountains and destroyed or annihilated enemy troops in two encounters. Thus they arrived at the designated location at the appointed time, controlled the highway between Banangun and Fengtu, and disrupted the enemy's defensive system.

To occupy the strategic point, Basha Pass, the high Command ordered them to take Hill 106, a protective barrier for Basha Pass. The company had had no sleep for 2 days and nights but still kept up their forced march and arrived at the battleground. With artillery support, the 7th Company braved enemy fire and was the

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first to occupy that hill. To recapture this strategic point, the enemy organized two companies of the so-called "crack" Division 316A and some local units, totaling more than 300, for a fierce counterattack. Despite their fatigue and hunger, the commanders and fighters of the 7th Company bravely fought on and successfully repulsed these enemy attacks. Its battle array remained as secure as a mountain.

In every engagement, this regiment fought the enemy troops at close range in order to completely destroy them. The regiment commanders usually directed the operation in the battalions and the battalion commanders directed the attack in the companies. In fact, the commanders at all levels were close to the firing line when they directed the fighting. On many occasions, the cadres and fighters all went as far as 20 or 15 meters within the enemy's front positions to lead the attacks under heavy enemy fire. In the attack on Hill 149, the 9th Company bravely made several outflanking thrusts and then fought its way into enemy positions. Many enemy troops were killed before they had time to put on their pants. On its homeward march on 5 March, this regiment was harrassed by enemy forces. It promptly surrounded a reinforced Vietnamese battalion entrenched in Banxiaosan. At the very onset, the three battalions of this regiment, like three sharp knives, cut the enemy column into three sections. The 2d Company, serving as the main attacking force, bravely dashed into the enemy position and fought the enemy at short range. With overwhelming heroism and sagacious tactics, the fighters soon silenced the enemy forts and firing spots, captured one trench after another, and finally occupied the main peak. More than 300 enemy troops including one Vietnamese major and two captains were killed in this single action.

During the counterattack in self-defense, which lasted 21 days, this regiment fought 29 large and small battles and won victories in all of them. It captured 24 enemy defended mountains, some of them more than 1,000 meters high, and this was how two combat heroes Tao Shaowan [7118 4801 2429] and Jiang Jinzhu [5592 6855 2691] became famous. The unit party committee has requested the Military Commission to confer honorable titles on two companies. They have written another new chapter in the glorious history of the regiment.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

LEARNING ABOUT THE ENEMY STRESSED IN MILITARY TRAINING

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 2 May 79 p 2

[Article by correspondents Chen Xiangmin [7115 0686 3046], Tang Yongsheng [0781 3057 3932], Chen Wenbao [7115 2429 1405] and Li Zhixi [2121 0037 3556]: "Learning About the Enemy Should Predominate the Entire Course of Training-- Technical and Tactical Training of Certain Regiment Shows Marked Improvement"]

[Text] Benefiting from the experiences of the counterattack in self-defense along the Sino-Vietnamese border, a certain infantry regiment of the Shenyang PLA Units is now attaching great importance in its technical and tactical training program to learning about the enemy. In so doing, it has highlighted the most important point of training and improved its quality. The proportion of people who know how to use rocket 40 in the infantry companies of the regiment has now increased from 16 to 89 percent, and the rate of accuracy in live ammunition practice has been raised to 97.2 percent. There has also been marked improvement in both offensive and defensive tactics among the individual fighters as well as the squads, platoons and companies.

While conducting training in the past, this regiment was not quite clear about the primary need to oppose tanks. Therefore, it did not take timely action to make up for the shortage of cadres in the rocket 40 platoons and the recoilless gun companies. There were insufficient men in the rank and file, and even so, these units were frequently called on to undertake certain odd jobs. As a result, the antitank training of the regiments was very poor. In a military exercise held in 1980, these defects were fully exposed. From this experience, the responsible persons of the regiment deeply realized that if they did not learn about the special characteristics of the enemy or failed to bear in mind the situation of the enemy while conducting training, they would fail to grasp the main point of training. Therefore, to grasp this main point, they have to pay great attention to learning about the enemy. Later, they were even more convinced after studying the experiences of the counterattack in self-defense along the Sino-Vietnamese border. They further realized that we must know ourselves as well as the enemy before we can be invincible, and that learning about the enemy should predominate the entire training course before the quality of training could be improved. In the past 2 months, they organized the cadres and fighters to read and study articles from some journals, such as JUNSHI XUESHU [MILITARY SCIENCE] and WAIJUN JUNSHI XUESHU [FOREIGN MILITARY SCIENCE], dealing with the organization of the enemy's armed forces, their equipment, the special features of their fighting techniques, and other similar materials, and dozens of articles

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and monographs about the enemy. These activities have broadened everyone's vision and enriched their minds. Subsequent training has been more to the point.

Learning about the enemy has helped the PLA Units grasp the key point of training. They now understand that in land warfare, the enemy relied mainly on tanks, and our infantry regiment should first be well trained in the use of antitank weapons, which, in our infantry regiments, mainly consist of rocket 40. Therefore, the use of rockets became the key subject in training. In training on the use of rocket 40, they organized the cadres and fighters to study how one of our infantry battalion should fight an enemy tank company and to learn about the enemy's situation. From such study, everyone now knows that each enemy tank company is equipped with 10 tanks, and that each infantry battalion on our side is equipped with 54 rockets. This means an average of 5 or 6 rockets against one enemy tank with the odds in our favor. From an analysis, they learned about the special features of enemy tanks as well as the functions of our rocket 40. Then they determined to step up training on the use of these rockets and changed their attitude toward antitank units. These units were then fully staffed and their time and personnel were available for training with particular stress to assure substance and quality. At the same time, they quickly solved the problems of insufficient personnel, teaching materials and equipment, and ran 2 terms of training for backbone rocket 40 elements. They also compiled teaching materials on the tactics of opposing tanks with rocket 40 in a unified teaching program. All the necessary equipment and materials were prepared; two dummy tanks serving as moving targets, 24 breech-loading guns and more than 700 rounds of training bullets made of cement and wood were manufactured. They also paid attention to the popularization of these skills, and everybody from rocket shooters to rifle shooters, from leading cadres to miscellaneous personnel was taught the use of rocket 40. Because of their serious efforts, training in the use of rocket 40 soon achieved excellent results. The rate of accuracy in live ammunition practice was raised to 97.2 percent.

Tactical training has been enlivened as a result of greater efforts to learn about the enemy. Before early February, they did not pay sufficient attention to the study of enemy tanks when training was carried out on offensive and defensive tactics among individual fighters and squads. Later, benefiting from the experiences of the counterattack in self-defense along the Sino-Vietnamese border, they decided to study more about the enemy and the topographic features of the battleground, and gained a better idea of enemy tanks. In the last 10 days of February, when offensive and defensive tactical training was carried out among the platoons and companies, changes in varying degrees were made on enemy equipment and tactical maneuvers. For example, in making use of the terrain and its features, they were very attentive to the grave mounds and other earth mounds projecting out of the ground's surface. After learning about the maneuverability of tanks and their impact on other objects, they became aware that grave and earth mounds could only be effective in dealing with ground forces, but not tanks. Thus they stressed the need to take advantage of shell craters, ditches and other concave structures as well as tall blocks and high dams that can provide protection against shelling from tanks. Again, in order to advance in spurts under enemy fire, the former practice was that each spurt should cover a distance of 30-60 meters. Is this still possible? After learning about the enemy, they realized that in modern warfare, when the enemy is amply equipped with tanks,

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armored cars and automatic high-speed weapons with intense firing, there can be, generally speaking, only a break of approximately 5 seconds from discovery of the target to the completion of a mission. If a distance of 30-60 meters has to be covered by each spurt, the time of exposure will last up to 7-15 seconds, and casualties can easily result from enemy fire. Therefore, in advancing by spurts under enemy fire, the time required is reduced to 4-7 seconds and the distance to be covered reduced to 15-30 meters. Along with the deepening of their study on the enemy in greater details, they felt the need to "think more and learn more" and gradually discarded the old rules and conventions. Training in offensive and defensive tactics among the companies was raised to a higher level.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

BORDER DEFENSE STRESSED

Dauntless Radar Company

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 3 May 79 p 2

[Battlefield report by Zheng Jixu [6774 4949 4958], Sun Maoqing [1327 5399 1987], and Liu Ye [0491 0048]: "The Steely Radar Soldiers"]

[Text] How can a strong, erect heroic tree be afraid of storms? How can the motherland's vigilant radar soldiers be afraid of cannon fire and gun smoke? During the war of self-defensive counter-attack, the 12th radar company of a certain contingent of the air force underwent the test of fire and gloriously earned a Merit Citation Class II. It deserves to be called the motherland's steely "telescope."

The 12th company was stationed on top of a tall mountain along the Guangxi border across a valley from Vietnam. After the war of self-defensive counter-attack broke out, the Vietnamese aggressors saw this company as the thorn in their eye and bombarded it ceaselessly. Within half a month, nearly 100 cannon shells fell on the mountain top and the entrenchment around it. The officers and men safeguarded their ground and fought heroically in vigilant defense of the motherland's sacred airspace. Ignoring the deafening salvoes of the bombardment, operators calmly sat in their radar trucks with eyes fixed on the fluorescent screens, continually cleared away the interference of electric sparks caused by the bombardment, let go of no points of suspicion, and inspected and reported conditions in the sky with despatch. In the underground command office of the company, company commander Yan Chuanchen [7051 0278 5256] held the telephone transmitter in his hand to issue his commands with quiet resolve. Plotting leader Huang Guolai [7806 0948 0171] bent over the plotting table, swiftly and accurately plotting the conditions in the sky as reported by the radar operators. Ignoring the thick smoke, the sentries at the mountain top under the guidance of deputy company commander Zhao Qingquan [6392 1987 0356] calmly continued to convey conditions in the sky and reported the points of impact of the Vietnamese cannon shells.

A misty rain fell, and cannon smoke filled the air. Wire communications squad leader Yang Bangrong [2799 6721 2837] and his comrade-in-arms Shen Guangyin [3088 0342 6892] carried two rolls of insulated wire on their shoulders and got ready to set up a new communications line. It turned out that there had been only one wire linking this company with its superior command. It occurred to them that if

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by chance this line should become damaged by enemy fire, then the communication between the company and the superior command would be cut. Hence they decided to set up a couple of lines at the mountain to the rear. The mountain slope was steep and slippery. Squad leader Yang and young Shen tied the insulated wire on their waists and slid down the steep slope just like boatmen pulling their boats. Thorns tore their uniforms and young Shen's legs were scratched and began to bleed. But they paid no attention. After some stubborn fighting, they set up a line more than 1,000 meters long in less than an hour. A short while after they came back, enemy fire actually severed the line at the front of the mountain, but the command office was quickly able to establish contact with army units in the neighborhood by using the line just set up. Later on, Yang Bangrong and Shen Guangyin still ignored their fatigue and braved the firing to quickly reconnect the line that had been cut off.

The enemy attempted in vain to destroy our radar position with cannon fire and send special agents to carry out sabotage, so they tried other stratagems. Once, just as the 12th radar company was closely watching conditions in the sky, an "order" was suddenly received by radio asking the 12th company to turn off its equipment. After this order was received, company commander Yan Chuanchen, who was on duty in the command office at the time, felt that something was wrong. He immediately reported this to the superior command office by telephone. It turned out that the superior command had not issued such an order, rather it was the enemy who was playing a trick on them. Thus the enemy's plot was again defeated.

"We must never let the radar antennas stop for a single minute because of equipment malfunctions!" This was the fighting determination of the maintenance cadre-men of the 12th company. In order to ensure that the antennas would never stop revolving, they missed their sleep and forgot their meals and often simply slept beside their radar sets and kept on diligently repairing, testing, and servicing them. Deputy company commander Yan Zhaoyun [0917 0340 6663], who was in charge of maintenance work, ignored his sickness and insisted on eating and sleeping right beside the radar sets. He often took advantage of the interval when the radar sets were shut off in the night so as to inspect weapons, and often a whole night was entirely spent on this. Once, just as he got one radar set adjusted, another mountain top entrenchment reflected that the pitch of their set was not functioning properly, so that the radar would pick up a target only when it was very close. He immediately hurried through the dark to inspect it, and personally mounted the set to observe and adjust until dawn. From then on, the emitter and receiver have been in top-notch condition. Even though a given radar set sometimes had to continue operating for more than 20 hours consecutively, they never had a critical malfunction.

Good Party Committee of the Military

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 25 May 79 p 1

[Editorial by staff commentator: "Effectively Defend and Build Up Border Areas"]

[Text] The Central Military Commission recently commended the Party committee of the First Garrison Division of the Beijing units, praising it as a good group

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rooted in the border area, struggling hard, and prepared to fight. At the end of the year before last, the Military Commission established for us the Party committee of the First Airborne Division of the Air Force as an advanced model; now it has called upon us to learn from the Party committee of the First Garrison Division. Party committees and leading comrades of troop units stationed in the border areas should learn from them, Party committees and leading comrades of troop units of the whole army should learn from them, so as to defend and build up our border areas well, and so as to make positive contributions to the defense of the construction of the motherland's four modernizations.

Our great motherland has a vast territory; its land boundary line alone measures more than 20,000 kilometers. Because of historical reasons, the economy of the border areas has always been backward, transportation inconvenient, and culture not very developed. But this is only one side of the problem; there is still another side. Residing in the border areas are the industrious and courageous people of various nationalities, and deposited there are precious minerals, large tracts of forests, boundless prairies, and fertile land awaiting us to reclaim. The border areas are connected to the heart of the motherland; they are the protective screen for the motherland. Without solid border defense, there can be no solid national defense; stable borders reinforce the tranquillity of the interior. If we love our motherland, we must love our border areas. If we wish to defend our lovely motherland, we must defend our lovely border areas.

"The founding of a state places emphasis on border defense, the responsibilities of the soldiers are therefore very heavy." Patriotic, enlightened men throughout history have taken defense of the border areas as a glorious undertaking. Patriotic poets of various dynasties all warmly praised heroes of the frontier garrisons who protected the security and unity of the state, shed their blood in the battlefields, reclaimed virgin land in the border areas while posted there, kept company with weapons and horses, grew old in remote deserts, feared neither difficulties nor dangers, and sacrificed their lives for the sake of the state. Among the poems written during the Tang Dynasty, there is one category called frontier poems. Li Bo [2621 4101], Li He [2621 6320], Wang Changling [3769 2490 7881], and Li Yi [2621 4135] all left poems in this regard. Stanzas such as "Fubo [0126 3134] wanted only to return with his corpse wrapped in horse hide; did Dingyuan [1353 6678] have to come back alive?" have always been relished by all. Fubo and Dingyuan denote the two famous generals of the Later Han Dynasty, Ma Yuan [7456 2266] and Ban Chao [3803 6389]. Ma Yuan said: "A man should die in the remote frontier areas and have his body wrapped in horse hide when returned for burial; how can he die in bed in the hands of women and children?" These two stanzas are meant to say that since Ma Yuan fought back and forth in battlefields and wished only to die while fighting and return with his corpse wrapped in horse hide, why did Ban Chao have to request his return while still alive? Patriotic officers and men stationed at the frontiers to guard against the enemies in history had their limitations under the historical conditions of their times; yet their spirit of dedication in protecting state integrity and national unity is undoubtedly praiseworthy. However, "when counting romantic heroes, we must still look at today." Those most worthy of our praise today are our proletarian patriots, the people's frontier defense warriors. Just as Comrade Zhou Enlai pointed out, they are unstintingly dedicating their all to the strengthening of frontier defense and

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protection of the motherland with such heroic sentiments and fierce determination as can be only described by "In the green mountains are buried bones of the loyal ones everywhere, Why should anyone need to wish to return with his corpse wrapped in horse hide!" In the long-term arduous struggle in keeping guard over frontier defense and coastal defense, in the war of defense over the Zhenbao Island, and in the war of self-defensive counter-attack along the Sino-Vietnamese border this time, many heroic personalities have surged forth who are glad to endure hardship and most ready to dedicate their lives for the security of the motherland and the happiness of the people; their spiritual state is superior to that of the national heroes in history by, indeed, innumerable times!

For a very long time before liberation, our country actually had frontiers but no frontier defense. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, we began only to build up our frontier defense. Lin Biao and "gang of four" promoted a reactionary principle of so-called "political frontier defense" and led to the building of our frontier defense suffering a great sabotage. Today, in the north there exists this big hegemon, the Soviet Union, whose ambition to annex us never dies, and in the south, too, we face this little hegemon, Vietnam, which continues to challenge and bother us. Once war breaks out, whether the fighting is going to be of large, medium, or small scale, frontier defense is bound to be first and foremost called into question. It is imperative that we quickly build up our frontier defense well. Generally speaking, conditions in the border areas are less enticing and life there is harder and more difficult. In order to put down roots in the border areas and build up our solid frontier defense, we must have the lofty ideal of viewing the security of the motherland as superior to all other concerns, submitting unconditionally to the demand of the revolution, taking the border areas as our home, and finding glory in being stationed at the frontier, and we must have the heroic disposition of fearing neither hardship nor death. In a word, we must have the revolutionary spirit of hard struggle. Comrades of the First Garrison Division have put it well, "Don't say that environs beyond the Great Wall are harsh, They are closely connected with the happy homes of millions." The selfless working spirit, lofty revolutionary sentiments, fine workstyle of paying attention to the livelihood of the masses, and the precious quality of strict self-discipline on the part of the comrades of the Party committee of the First Garrison Division are worthy of our study and need to be given full scope. Our Communist Party members, Communist Youth Corps members, and every revolutionary warrior, especially leading cadre, must emulate them, must give full play to the genuine political character of hard struggle on the part of our army. With a good leading group dedicated to hard struggle and good cadres dedicated to hard struggle, the motherland's frontier defense can really be built into an iron wall, the fighting power of the troops can be quickly improved, and the pace of construction of our army's revolutionary modernization can also be greatly accelerated.

In order to strengthen the building of our frontier defense, we must energetically develop socialist economic construction and cultural construction in the border areas. And in order to build up our frontier defense well, we must protect peace and stability in the border areas; otherwise conditions for working out the construction would be lacking. Our frontier defense units must actively participate in, and support, socialist construction in the border areas, and carry out re-education on nationality policies in order to strengthen the unity among the people

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of various nationalities and make contributions toward a quick change in the outlook of the border areas. Meanwhile, we must give full play to the spirit of patriotism and revolutionary heroism, learn the fighting experience in the war of self-defensive counter-attack along the Sino-Vietnamese border, raise our vigilance by a hundred times, grasp and put into effect various measures for war preparedness, do a good job on joint military-civilian defense deployment, and be prepared at all times to exterminate all enemies who dare to invade us. Frontier defense posts are extraordinarily glorious; frontier defense tasks are formidable. The Party committee of the First Garrison Division stationed at such a post have worked selflessly and achieved results; we must learn from it, catch up with it, and surpass it.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

REGIMENT IMPROVES ANTITANK SKILLS, TACTICS

Beijing JIEFANG JUNBAO in Chinese 10 May 79 p 1

[Article by Du Yongxue [2659 3057 1331] and Zang Xiaohua [5661 2556 5478]: "A Certain Regiment Trains the Various Service Arms in Coordinated Techniques and Tactics for Use Against Massed Tanks"]

[Text] In the middle third of March, units under the Nanjing Command and a certain army held an on-the-spot meeting in a certain regiment to disseminate this regiment's new experience in antitank training. After this regiment conscientiously investigated ways of training the various service arms in techniques and tactics for combatting massed tanks, it replaced the previous simple methods of training individual service arms, attacking individual tanks and focusing on the actions of the individual soldier, a change which improved their antitank training.

At the beginning of this year, when the command designated antitank warfare as the focus of strategic training, although the cadres and fighting men initially made adequate efforts, after a certain amount of training they felt that they had not yet achieved good results. What was the reason? The leadership discovered that the crux of the problem was that for a long time antitank training had been subject to the "three stops": it had stopped with single service arms, with attacking individual tanks, and with teaching operations by individual soldiers. This type of training could not meet the requirements of future combat, and the cadres became frustrated and the fighting men bored with it. The leadership decided to change this state of affairs by changing the training method, and they conducted a painstaking study of techniques and tactics for the various service arms to wage coordinated warfare against massed tanks, producing the "three changeovers" in training.

The first of these was the changeover from attacking individual tanks to attacking massed tanks. The party committee began by stressing the study of enemy armies, and assigned deputy regimental commander Zhang Tianfu [1728 1131 1381] the task of organizing personnel to set up an intelligence room in which they collected and organized data on enemy tank units' organization and firepower, their combat capabilities and their characteristic methods of combat and drew up charts so as to help the cadres and fighting men understand the enemy. The training sections also introduced the units to examples of modern limited war, giving the cadres and fighting men a wider horizon. In conducting antitank training, they no longer set up the enemy situation on the basis of wishful thinking, but instead concentrated on training in skills and tactics based on the way in which the enemy uses tanks in

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the offensive and disposes his defensive firepower. For example, when Company No 7 was conducting company defensive training, they assumed that their defensive frontage could withstand an assault by 30 to 40 tanks and armored vehicles, so that the company's antitank units would have to deal with an average of two tanks each, in addition to enemy air, artillery and chemical attacks, which made the situation even more complex. These assumptions about the enemy presented a real challenge to the cadres and fighting men.

The second changeover was from the use of a single service arm against tanks to the use of several service arms in coordinated antitank combat. The training was centrally organized and the unit's technical arms and fire subunits were attached to the individual infantry subunits, so that the latter gained increased understanding through joint training and achieved close coordination. In this way the cadres learned organization and command, the fighting men received training in joint operations, and skills and tactical ability were rapidly improved. When this task of demonstration and education was undertaken, in addition to assigning a platoon each of [illegible] recoilless rifles, 82 mm mortars and heavy machine guns from battalion assets, the leadership also requested the higher levels to assign Company No 7 a tank platoon, a platoon of 85 mm guns, an engineer squad and a flame-thrower squad. When company commander Xu Huixin realized that the subunits assigned to him had more manpower than his own company, for a while he had difficulty keeping track of them all and did not know where to start. Then, with the help of the various subunits attached to his company, he gradually became familiar with weapons deployment and the construction of field works, control of communications and conduct of joint operations during exercises and the like. In the training process, the cadres and fighting men adopted the "strike, bombard, impede" method of dealing with enemy massed tanks, their interest in the training increased, and they developed some experience in resisting tank assaults and resisting enemy development in depth, and in coordination between the various service arms in a joint struggle with sister units to counterattack and regain positions.

The third changeover was from operations by individual soldiers to tactical training at the squad level and above. Previously, in antitank training the cadres and fighters had only to master the use of five types of materiel and they were finished. Now, however, this unit laid full stress on integrating individual soldier operations into squad, platoon and company level tactics, and in squad and group exercises in dealing with massed enemy tanks it stressed ways of providing mutual cover, ways of changing formations and misleading the enemy, and techniques of mutual support between fixed and mobile troops and firepower. The result was that the cadres and fighting men were able to coordinate effectively the skills and tactics they had learned.

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RAILWAY FORCES PROMOTE TECHNICAL CADRES

Beijing JIEFANG JUNBAO in Chinese 10 May 79 p 1

[Article by Zhao Hongchang [6392 3163 2490] and Zhao Shusan [6392 2579 0005]:  
"Railroad Troops Promote Thirteen Technical Cadres to Division Leadership Posts"]

[Text] Recently a group of engineering and technical cadres in units of the railway forces were promoted to division leadership posts; seven were made division deputy commanders, one was made a division chief of staff, and five were sent to assume division-level leadership posts in educational institutions, offices and other units.

Most of these technical cadres were promoted from the posts of division chief engineer or deputy chief engineer. All of them are graduates of institutions of higher education, and some have also studied abroad. Their level of basic theoretical knowledge is very high, and they have all been active in the railway forces for a long period. Most of these comrades participated in the construction of such railways as the Yanxia (Yantan-Xiamen), Baolan (Baotou-Lanzhou), Chengkun (Chengdu-Kunming) and Xiangyu (Xiangfan-Chongqing) lines, and they have rich practical experience in railway building in the hot, rainy south, the icebound, snow-blown north, the frigid, rarefied plateaus, and the climatically variable Gobi. During a prolonged of technical work, they have helped leadership at all levels to organize and command construction, and they have a certain organizational and command ability. When the order promoting these comrades to divisional leadership posts was published, there was an enthusiastic response in the units. It was universally felt that given leaders with such expertise, it will unquestionably be possible to build the railways faster and better.

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COMPANY AWARDED HONORABLE DESIGNATION FOR COMBAT SUCCESS

Beijing JIEFANG JUNBAO in Chinese 10 May 79 p 2

[Article by Zhang Guangtong [1728 1639 2717], Wang Zhenying [3769 2182 3602] and Xing Shicao [6717 4258 2347]: "Energetically Carrying on the Glorious Military Tradition, Winning Combat Glory by Invincible Boldness"]

[Text] Recently, Company No 1 of a certain regiment was given the glorious designation of "Heroic Company of Koudang Mountain" by the Gunagxi Border Defense Command.

On 1 March, the company received a combat assignment to make the main attack on Koudang Mountain. Koudang Mountain is one of four commanding elevations surrounding Liang Mountain and a part of the Liang Mountain "fortress." It controls two railways passing from Liang Mountain to Beijing and Nanjing, and forms a natural barrier northeast of Liang Mountain. Before the main peak are 33 hills of various sizes, and on both sides of the mountain are extremely precipitous cliffs. More than 200 Vietnamese soldiers were dug in on this natural barrier. If this key point were not taken, not only would our forces attacking Liang Mountain from the side be blocked, but the main force that was carrying out a frontal attack on Liang Mountain might be threatened. To achieve victory, Company No 1's commander rapidly completed his preparations for a bold assault in spite of the fatigue of several days and nights of continuous marching.

Covered by powerful artillery fire from our border defense forces, and lying concealed in the rain on the edge of Hill No 1, Company No 1's officers and men suddenly leapt up and took advantage of a thick fog to launch a furious assault on the enemy. The point platoon, led by platoon commander Tang Lunxiu, broke through two enemy defensive perimeters in less than an hour and a half and ascended Hill No 2. As soon as Company No 1 had reached the top of Hill No 2, enemy troops on both sides frenziedly sealed off their avenues of retreat and advance with dense fire from anti-aircraft machine guns. Under the enemy crossfire, the company commander did not panic, but continued the assault towards Hill No 3. They struck deep into the enemy forces defending Koudang Mountain, assuring that our large units would be able to advance successfully on Liang Mountain.

Nightfall was approaching. Company No 1's commander received the order to go over to the defense where he stood. The soldiers were only 60 or 70 meters away from the enemy, and could even hear clearly the sound of the enemy's coughing. The branch organized the men to build defensive bunkers and dispatched concealed sentries. Shortly after 4 o'clock the next morning, the party branch held a branch

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committee meeting in the rain, analyzed the lessons of the first day's fighting, and decided to make concentrated use of heavy weapons to destroy the enemy's bunkers and open and concealed firing positions and to provide cover for an infantry assault that would take the main peak of Koudang Mountain.

At 7:30 in the morning, the commander of Platoon 2, Chen Shijin, cradling a sub-machine gun, led his platoon in the assault on the enemy. Unfortunately, Chen Shijin was wounded in the right foot by shrapnel. Deputy Commander Yan Faming rushed forward and took over from Commander Chen; he and Platoon 1's commander Song Jiaqi combined their units and drew the enemy's fire with a machine gun, while six rocket launchers and two 82 mm recoilless rifles were divided into two groups which covered each other and silenced 16 enemy open and covered firing positions. After 4 1/2 hours of heavy fighting, the officers and men of Platoons 1 and 2 had reduced the key defensive positions which the enemy had painstakingly built up over many years to chaos. The enemy retreated steadily like birds at the sound of the rifle. The company's officers and men fought with ever-increasing fierceness and pressed close on their heels, taking Hills No 4 and 5. This time the company was divided into three groups, like three sharp swords piercing the enemy formations. The Vietnamese forces scrambled southward in disorder. Some of them ran in panic off the cliffs and fell to their deaths, some were shot dead by our forces, and some threw away their weapons in their rush to save themselves.

In the attack on Koudang Mountain, many heroic soldiers with epic achievements emerged in Company No 1. After the assault, rocket launcher squad commander Bi Zhenhe boldly destroyed two enemy firing positions on Hill No 2, opening the way for the entire company. In the assault on Hill No 3, platoon No 3 was converted to a reserve force. Bi Zhenhe said: "I am a Communist Party member, and I cannot leave the front line!" He hurried forward with platoons 1 and 2, and he and his comrades in arms destroyed three enemy firing positions. After being wounded, he persevered in the struggle, destroying two enemy machine gun emplacements. When the commander of Squad 8 was gravely wounded, deputy commander Wang Fengming led the squad forward, and when he was wounded he resolutely refused to leave the front line, but commanded his men with recoilless rifles and rocket launchers as they destroyed three enemy firing positions. When his comrades came to his rescue, he kept shouting in his delirium, "Rocket launchers! Rocket launchers fire over here!" When the fighting started, deputy company commander Huang Bingsheng led the point platoon's charge at the battle line. While leading the comrades of Platoon No 3 in the assault on Hill No 3, he was wounded in the right foot by shrapnel, but he gritted his teeth, pulled out the piece of shrapnel, and continued leading the fighters against the retreating foe. When the attack was launched at dawn the next day, although wounded, he led Platoon 1 as it captured five hills. After the main peak was captured, he led nine comrades of Platoon 3 in a mopping-up operation, fully carrying out his combat assignment.

The officers and men of Company No 1 continued our army's indomitable and glorious traditions and accomplished with distinction their mission of attacking and holding Koudang Mountain. The unit's party committee awarded them a collective citation for merit, first class, and gave them a pennant reading "Bold and Indomitable, Valorous in Assaulting Fortifications."

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ANTI-CHEMICAL WARFARE FORCES PROVIDE EFFECTIVE SUPPORT

Beijing JIEFANG JUNBAO in Chinese 10 May 79 p 2

[Article: "Bringing Antichemical Capabilities into Play, Supporting the Combat Operations of the Infantry and Artillery"]

[Text] In the defensive counterattack and the struggle to protect the border, Company 5, Battalion 2 of a certain antichemical unit displayed a revolutionary spirit of not fearing to sacrifice themselves and thoroughly brought antichemical protective effects into play, energetically supporting infantry and artillery combat operations, for which many of their comrades asked the higher command levels to record their achievements.

As soon as Company No 5 joined the combat unit to which it had been attached, it took the initiative in helping conduct education and training in the "three defenses." It inspected the protective materials which each unit had at its disposal, trained a large number of key "three defenses" workers for the unit to which it was attached and for the militia, and prepared more than 670 simple, easy-to-use protective items.

When the battle started, these troops concerned themselves over the critical moment at the beginning of battle, and over enemy chemical attacks, and neglected no doubtful cases. In order to be able to observe and diagnose every enemy shell burst, they led the way when the infantry and artillery were advancing and attacking, and when positions were being held they set up sentries at the perimeters to maintain continuous observation day and night. In order to resolve difficult cases, they also constantly hurried out of the bunkers and trenches, risking death from enemy artillery and rifle fire, and rushed to locations at which enemy shells had exploded to conduct chemical reconnaissance. On 18 February, a certain artillery position to which Squad 8 was assigned suffered an enemy artillery attack, and the concentrated fire made observation difficult. But for the safety of their comrades-in-arms, the artillerymen, the three comrades who were on watch risked death and left the bunkers 21 times to go to the sites of enemy artillery shell bursts and conduct reconnaissance, eliminating one dubious case after another with dispatch, for which they received the praise of the artillery commander and comrades.

During the battle, the cadres of Company No 5 led the way and were always at the most dangerous and difficult locations. When the battle was the fiercest, the company commander and political officer went to the forward positions to carry out observation and to pass on their experience in distinguishing enemy chemical rounds.

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Commander of Platoon 2 Liao Junjie and Squad No 6 were responsible for chemical protection tasks at a certain ferry point on the Red River. They set up an anti-chemical observation post on an unnamed height to the right of Hill 230, and maintained observation along with the fighters day and night, without closing their eyes for several nights running. At the moment when the observation post was under the fiercest enemy attack, platoon leader Liao would always make the fighters take cover while he himself took over observation. This cadre's exemplary actions were like an unspoken order, and the comrades of the entire company were inspired to be fearless of death, to disregard fatigue, and to persist scrupulously in keeping watch at the observation post. Platoon No 1 was in charge of chemical protection work for a deep-thrust unit. Although every comrade carried a load of more than 50 jin, in addition to protective materials, they went wherever the unit went. One day, Squad 2 advanced with the unit to the vicinity of Longjin and ran into an artillery attack. The commander gave the order to put on protective masks. Marching with protective masks on is a drain on energy, and in order to keep the infantry comrades maintain their combat vigor, the chemical squad immediately made a reconnaissance, found out the true situation, and reported it to the commander, who canceled the order to put on protective masks.

At about 9 AM on 26 February, Squad No 8 returned to Hill No 4 at Buting with an artillery grouping. In order to post observers, deputy squad commander Hou Shishou set out to examine the position. Suddenly a muffled explosion was heard at a distance. When he raised his head and looked, all he could see was a white curtain of smoke over a neighboring unit's antiaircraft battery forward and to his right, in addition to which he smelled a strange odor. Immediately his voice rang out: "This is bad: a chemical round. Detachment 2, follow me!" No sooner had he spoken than he darted toward the antiaircraft company's position. The three comrades of Detachment 2 were close behind him. They quickly made a reconnaissance under enemy fire, determined that it was an enemy chemical round, and immediately filled in the shell hole and carried out decontamination treatment for the comrades who had been affected, thus avoiding casualties.

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NAVIGATOR DIRECTS SAFE LANDING OF AIRCRAFT IN POOR WEATHER

Beijing JIEFANG JUNBAO in Chinese 10 May 79 p 2

[Article by Han Hesheng [7281 0735 3932], Li Yingjie [2621 5391 2638] and Xiong Shusheng [3574 2885 3932]: "Boldly Shouldering a Heavy Task with Courage and Resolution"]

[Text] Officer in charge of the instrument landing radar station of a certain air force airfield under the Fuzhou command navigator Comrade Bai Taihai showed boldness and resolution in guiding 12 endangered aircraft to a safe landing. The higher level party committee decided to award Bai Taihai a commendation for merit, second class, and gave him a money award.

On 17 January, a certain air force unit was conducting a bad weather flight training exercise. At about 11:15, a large, dark cloud mass arose suddenly in the northwest, with a ceiling of 200 meters, and completely covered the entire airfield; the visibility dropped to 1.5 kilometers, lower than the minimum permissible flying visibility. At that time, 11 fighters on a training mission and one civilian aircraft carrying more than 40 passengers were urgently waiting to land. At this point the pilots could not see the runway, and the commander could not see the aircraft; their fuel was limited and the only possible way out was to use the instrument landing radar to bring them in for a landing. Navigator on duty Bai Taihai had never encountered such a complex situation, but he boldly took responsibility, and intensely and concentratedly observed the aircraft blips on the screen. At 11:20, the first aircraft completed a circle and descended toward the airfield. Bai Taihai discovered that the aircraft was 50 meters too low and its course was 150 meters off the line of the runway. It was only 40 seconds between completion of the circle and the touchdown, and there was no time to correct such a large deviation. He immediately reported to the commander, and suggested that he pull up. The first aircraft was unsuccessful on the second pass as well. It was low on fuel, so that it must succeed on the third pass; otherwise the results would be unthinkable. Bai Taihai kept calm, and rapidly found that the reason why the first aircraft had failed on its first two approaches was that it had locked in on its objective too early. On the basis of precise guidance calculations and the pilot's operating characteristics he gave the command to exit from the circle at just the right time. The aircraft moved into the ideal flight path, and when he found a deviation he gave timely instructions for its correction, so that the first aircraft successfully touched down on the runway. On the basis of the first aircraft's success in landing, he watched the aircraft blips on the screen and continuously gave out concise, correct, clear orders and made timely corrections to

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the planes' altitude and heading. One after another the aircraft broke through the cloud barrier and descended smoothly to the runway. After 50 minutes of intense struggle, all 12 aircraft had landed successfully. For his spirit of bold accomplishment of the assigned task, Bai Taihai received everyone's commendation.

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REFORM OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF AIR FORCE TRAINING DISCUSSED

Teaching Materials

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 May 79 p 3

[Article by Jin Zhifu [6855 1807 4395] of the Air Force under Jinan PLA Units:  
"There Is an Urgent Need To Revise Teaching Materials for Aviation Training"]

[Text] When I came to the PLA units for news coverage, many air crew members had complaints about the teaching materials for training aviators and hoped that the high command would attach greater importance to the question of reform.

Even now, the air force does not have a complete manual for technical and tactical training that conforms to the characteristics of modern air combat. Most of the teaching materials now in use are of the 1950 vintage, copied from the Soviet Army, and there are many problems with them. First, there is the lack of uniformity. There are more than 20 different textbooks for the air force, and the numerical data in them are not the same. The data contained in the textbooks for the air service are different from those for the ground service even though they deal with the same subject. The crew members are in a predicament, not knowing which set of data to follow in conducting training. Secondly, the teaching materials and equipment now in use are not being developed adequately. In air target shooting, for instance, the speed per hour given in the teaching material is based on our aircraft performance in the 1950's. Now, after a long time, the speed per hour still remains unchanged even though the air force has supersonic planes. The training has to be based on the old speed. In fact, we are using other people's teaching materials, and they have already revised theirs. Yet we are still "following the old ruts" and using the same old teaching materials for training with new equipment. Thirdly, there is the lack of teaching material for tactical training. We have not carried out tactical training for the air arm for many years. Now, many units have completed their training according to the maximum program, and conditions are ripe for tactical training. Yet, without the required teaching materials, the airmen can only study the old subjects repeatedly, no matter how eager they may be to learn.

The crew members have made many suggestions concerning reform of the teaching material. These suggestions can be summarized as follows:

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The teaching material should be more to the point. The crew members mentioned that training according to the present teaching material is by no means reassuring, because they have no idea of the enemy's equipment, the characteristics of the enemy's plane performance, and the enemy's fighting techniques and tactics. Therefore, they do not know how to conduct the training in order that advantageous methods of fighting can be adopted. They hope that the leading organs will compile some materials for air force training with particular reference to the enemy's weapons, equipment and the tactics likely to be encountered in future counter-attacks in self-defense. They proposed that some textbooks be compiled for the study of the characteristics of the Soviet Air Force and our tactics, with a detailed description of the weapons and equipment used by the Soviet Air Force, their merits and shortcomings, their principal tactics, the way to use our strength against their weakness and so forth.

The teaching material should give prominence to the key points. The present training program deals at very great length with basic training and is very time-consuming. On the other hand, specific training for combat is not enough according to the present training program. It is hoped that the materials can be improved using the method of the difficult leading the easy and using tactics to consolidate techniques, so that the substance of training can be carefully chosen and prominence given to key subjects. Let us compare ourselves with other countries that have remodeled the same type of fighter plane and are using the same type of training aircraft as ours. The number of their exercises is only 42 percent of ours, but their time required for each exercise doubles that of ours. Thus in comparison, the time required by them to complete the remodeling of the fighter plane is 12 percent less than ours and their quality of training is even better than ours. This shows the urgent need to reform our training program.

In our teaching materials, we should give prominence to combat training. The crew members hope that more combat training will be provided by the teaching materials. They also mentioned that in the war in the Middle East, Israel with better tactical training was able to win even though the ratio of plane numbers was two to one in favor of the enemy. We should draw our lessons from this experience. The crew members earnestly hoped for a good volume of tactical training materials. They also hoped that the leading organs would keep them constantly supplied with materials concerning the tactical ideas and methods of the enemy, and the trend of tactical training in foreign countries, so as to broaden their vision and improve the quality of tactical training.

The air force is a highly technical military arm. In reforming the training, we should emancipate our minds and take a strictly scientific approach. The crew members held that in reforming aviation teaching materials, experiments can be first carried out, and popularization can go side by side with experimentation so that a complete set of textbooks can be compiled in the course of practice. We should neither hope for quick success after only one single trial, nor remain unchanged at all, but rather make changes along with the changing conditions.

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Training Ground Personnel

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 May 79 p 3

[Article by Zhou Huan [0719 5700 1344], commander of a certain air division under Guangzhou PLA Units: "In Flight Training, There Should Be Specialized Ground Commanders"]

[Text] At present, flight training is being undertaken by the leading cadres of divisions and regiments serving as ground commanders. In directing a certain number of flights, a great deal of specific organizational planning and other preparations are required. In fact, a lot of energy has to be expended in air dispatching. Divisional and regimental aviation's leading cadres have toiled for months and years on complex and heavy ground jobs which may affect their own flying skill and divert their attention from the technical and tactical training of air units. Furthermore, because of the lack of concentration in training on energy and attention to details, their ground control work can be affected, even to the point of causing air accidents. The shortcomings of this arrangement outweigh its merits.

At present, air force ground control of many countries is undertaken by the ground crew, and sometimes by women, who are responsible for directing take-offs and landings, air dispatching, and providing navigational aids. Based on the experience of many years' organized training and on foreign military experiences, we hold that flight training directed from the ground should not be undertaken by divisional or regimental cadres. This job can be given to ground commanders chosen from grounded aviators or qualified members of the general staff, provided they have received special training for this type of work. This will enable the divisional and regimental cadres to devote their main efforts to the improvement of their own skill in leading flight formations, in giving directions and in raising the technical and tactical levels of their units. The specialized ground commanders can also become experts in their own field by concentrating their energy on the study of air dispatching. This will further strengthen the air command and be of great benefit to the training of air units.

Air Circling

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 May 79 p 3

[Article by Gu Weizhan [7357 4850 1455] of the Air Force under Shenyang PLA Units: "'Circling in Air' Does More Harm than Good"]

[Text] Every year, the high command sets a new flight time standard for aviation training. What shall we do with this standard? The phenomenon of "circling in the air" has now appeared in some units.

Let us take the bombing training corps of a certain aviation school, for example. In 1980, the effects of circling in the air in order to meet the training time standard set by the high command were not keenly felt. This year, however, the high command has increased the training flight time according to a new standard,

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and the practice of circling has become more startling. In instrument flying, for example, two circles had to be completed in the air last year; now it has to be three circles, and if the tank fuel permits, two more takeoffs and landings have to be made. Thus each flight will last more than 90 minutes. In fact, this type of circling is unnecessary, because it is no more than "sightseeing in the air." There is still this spectacle in the skyraider units: Short navigation routes have become long; and a small radius has become large; and so forth. This "circling in the air" has become an expedient to increase flight time.

Of course, there is nothing wrong in flying long distances and making a few more circles, if this is conducive to better flying techniques and better familiarization with the plane's maneuverability in the air. However, if the purpose of "circling in the air" is only to make up the standard flight time, it will do more harm than good. First, it means waste of fuel and loss of state wealth. Secondly, there is the waste of aviation material and the shortening of engine life. Thirdly, the waste of time may slow down technical improvements. Although "circling in the air" adds to the flight time, the aviator learns less from the same amount of time. Thus the time is wasted, and no progress can be made in the study of the required subjects or the mastery of the required skills.

Since flight time is very precious, how could there be "circling in the air"? It is because people at both higher and lower levels have mistaken ideas in the evaluation of the quality of aviation training. Some of them one-sidedly believe that as long as the rigid standard of flight time is met, they can safely report to the high command on the fulfillment of their assigned duty. In most cases, no question is asked about technical and tactical improvement gained during the flight time. Thus no improvement is made even though the flight-time standard is met. Technical and tactical training still remains at the "first-year" level. This practice of evaluating the quality of training only in terms of flight time must be corrected, and the time, progress and quality factors must be considered jointly. Flight time is one of the indications of the quality of training, but not the only indication. The time factor is only an outward appearance, but skill, progress and quality are the essence, and the goal. The time spent can only be valuable provided it is associated with progress and higher quality. Only in such a spirit can the aviator really learn his flying techniques and tactics and improve his fighting skill by making use of his precious flight time.

## Composite Air Force Training

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 May 79 p 3

[Article by Du Jicheng [2629 0679 2052], Zhang Jieying [1728 2638 5391] and Dong Youlan [5516 0645 5696] of Air Force Training Department: "Strengthen Composite Training for Air Force"]

[Text] In modern warfare, the coordination of various participating services is a complex task. For the air force, there is the question of not only coordination with the infantry and the navy, but also coordination among different types of aircraft, and with the anti-aircraft units, surface-to-air guided missile units and radar units. Therefore, the strengthening of composite training is an important task in increasing the fighting capacity of the air force in modern warfare.

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In foreign countries, the armed forces generally attach great importance to the composite training of various arms and services. The Soviet Armed Forces regard this as the "highest form" of training and the "most important means" of raising the quality of the military service. According to incomplete statistics in 1978, the Soviet Air Force at the frontline conducted more than 3,000 flights during its participation in composite training.

The U.S. Armed Forces also attach great importance to effective coordinated action in combat training after the completion of training in solo flights. Accordingly, the Tactical Command of the U.S. Air Force worked out composite training programs designated by different "flags." According to these programs, the Soviet Armed Forces are generally taken as the enemy, and the substance includes operational directions from the cadres, fighting with joint forces, offensive and defensive exercises, and so forth. In these exercises, every possible attempt is made to imitate Soviet weapons, tactics and equipment as much as possible so that the composite training will be as close to real life as possible. In the case of a penetration exercise designated by the "Red Flag," the targets used are imitations of the surface-to-air guided missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, and radar used in the defense system of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact group, and all services are accordingly organized for the composite training. In this way, the crew members will feel as though they are in real action, and will improve their fighting skill by learning to deal with the enemy's air defense weapons and radar system.

In the past several years, our air force has carried out mainly technical training, but very little composite training for the various arms. Even in the few composite exercises we have conducted, some services were there just for show. Therefore, lack of knowledge among the services and inefficiency in fighting with joint forces constitute a rather striking problem in our air force training. Now that many units have in the main completed their basic technical training, we should quickly adopt measures to strengthen the composite training of various services in order to meet the requirements of modern warfare. Therefore, we should stress the following points:

1. Step up the study program for all arms and services so as to familiarize them with the organization, equipment and fighting characteristics of both the enemy and ourselves. They should also understand the different functions of and tasks for different arms and services. It should be possible to run collective training classes in which different services can learn from one another. Also, we can keep them better informed by organizing more composite exercises which are close to real life.
2. Carry out training in simulated combat between different types of aircraft, ranging from combat between single planes to combat between mixed formations including bombers, scouting planes and fighters. Under conditions close to real life, we should conduct combat exercises between planes of different types so that the crew members will have ample opportunity to engage in dogfights with simulated enemy planes. This will familiarize them with enemy tactics in air combat and thus help them devise effective methods to fight the enemy.

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3. Conduct more composite exercises with participation by the air force, anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air guided missile units. These exercises should take place against a simulated background of real fighting, so that the commanders, crew members and ground personnel can all become familiar with the real environments of a battleground: the terrains and weather conditions in the combat zones, and the enemy's deployment, equipment, tactics and so forth.

4. In strengthening the composite training of various services, the key lies in the attention of the organs at or above army units to the work of organization. They should organize regular training in the coordination of fighters, bombers and transport planes, and in supporting land and naval forces. All arms and services should be trained in the direction of operations, tactics, communications, and mutual protection, so that they will thoroughly know one another's special characteristics, strengthen their will in fighting with joint forces and give play to the great might of combined efforts.

5. Set up training grounds for composite exercises. In these training grounds, there should be a simulated air defense system and equipment for communication and radar jamming on the enemy's side; and fighter bombers and reconnaissance planes to oppose enemy intrusions on our side. The air and ground units should be organized to carry out comprehensive exercises in offensive and defensive operations promptly to solve the problem of exposure and to raise the joint fighting power of all arms to a higher level.

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LOGISTICS MUST BE PROTECTED IN A FUTURE WAR

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 79 p 3

[Article by Gu Deru [7357 1795 1172]: "Modern Warfare and Logistics Defense"]

[Text] In modern warfare, all belligerent states make the destruction or the blocking off of the other side's rear area and the paralyzing of its rear area supply an important part of their strategy and tactics for preserving themselves and destroying their adversary. The fourth Middle East war was like this, and so were the Vietnamese war to resist U.S. aggression and our war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam. In the Vietnamese war to resist U.S. aggression, the United States, in order to stop the transport of materiel from the northern part of Vietnam to the southern part along the "Ho Chi Minh Trail," threw in large numbers of aircraft to bomb this long, narrow corridor. From October to December 1970 alone, U.S. aircraft made 2,746 bombing sorties against the "Ho Chi Minh Trail," an average of 31 sorties a day, dropping over 89,000 tons of bombs, an average of 81 tons per kilometer a day. In our war of self-defensive counter-attack against Vietnam, even though the Vietnamese army was neutralized by our superior military force, it still sought in vain by all means opportunities to reach and make harassing attacks on our rear area with the objective of cutting our logistics supply.

With the continual development of weapons and equipment for the military forces of various countries in the world, the dependence of combat units on logistics supply has become even greater, and the rear services units (elements) [fendui 0430 7130] increasingly have unavoidably become the key target of attack by the other side. The Soviet Union, the United States, and various other countries in the world all devote attention to improving the defensive capability of the rear services units. The Soviet Union stresses that in a future war "it will be necessary to organize the guarding and defense of the vast rear area and all the long lines of communication." The United States emphasizes that in a future war it will be necessary to protect the safety of the rear area: "It is necessary to guard against reconnaissance by Soviet military forces, to attack or wipe out the latent threat posed to logistics units by the Soviet military forces, and to take protective measures." The Soviet Union and the United States are not just talking about this; they have already taken some actual steps in an effort to improve the defensive capability of the rear service units. For example, in order to avoid serious damage to its lines of communication and transportation during war-time, the Soviet Union has begun to set up a railroad engineering corps and

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highway construction units that can undertake formidable rush repair missions. Moreover, the Soviet Armed Forces, in the past 10 years of military exercises, have on each occasion paid a great deal of attention to drilling in rush repairs of railroads, bridges, and highways. During the "Dnieper" exercise in 1976, units of the railroad engineering corps took only a few hours to erect a railroad ponton bridge. In order to guard against nuclear attacks on stored goods and materials such as fuel, civil equipment, and foodgrain during wartime, the Soviet Union widely uses the storage capacity of civil departments; in order to avoid the destruction during wartime of its stored goods and materials, the United States has spared no expense in funds and effort to provide storage in caves and underground. Of course, these are not the only measures taken by the Soviet Union and the United States, but we will not list the others one by one here.

In order to meet the requirements of a future war against aggression, we must vigorously strengthen the self-defense capability of rear services units (elements). The Soviet revisionists are bent on subjugating our country and one day they will strike at us. Once war breaks out, the Soviet Union will probably take the following combat actions against our rear area and rear area supply units: 1) it will use reconnaissance aircraft and satellites to observe our supply activities and materiel storage points and accordingly issue orders to attack; 2) it will dispatch aircraft to bomb and make conventional airborne assaults; 3) it will send artillery units equipped with tactical nuclear guided missiles to carry out artillery blocking fire; 4) it will use atomic, chemical, and bacteriological weapons; and 5) it will make fierce assaults with tank groups and motorized infantry, or concurrently carry out coordinated harassing attacks with small detachments. It is not hard to see that in a future modern war, the destruction and counterdestruction of the rear areas and rear services units, the struggle between blockade and counterblockade, will be extremely intense. If we do not understand or have not already understood this kind of threat and do not actively make good preparations, then we will suffer big losses when that time and situation come.

To improve the rear area's self-defensive capability and smash the enemy's power to destroy or blockade, we must strengthen the rear area's protective engineering works and self-defensive works. The important strategic and campaign storehouses must have facilities for the "three defenses." There must be detour routes for communication hubs and principal sections of highways or railroads, and air defense and engineering rush repair forces must be strengthened. The transportation lines between military depots must be built into unbreakable lines on which the many service arms can be combined for "transporting, fighting, repairing, and supplying." There must be unified plans and organization for all sorts of forces in the rear districts, and civil-military joint defense should be put into effect. We must learn to be adept in the skill of working during intervals between the enemy's destructive activities, such as skills in working at night. The logistics leading cadres must learn the skills of analyzing and judging situations so as to disperse or deploy logistics units and equipment to meet the changing requirements on the battlefield. They must also study the establishment of logistics security forces at every level in order to strengthen the rear area security forces and the armed logistics personnel. In short, the situation must be like it was in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, in which "supply was assured during battle and battle was waged while assuring supply."

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In the past and during the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam, we accumulated much rich experience in launching struggles against the enemy and protecting the safety of the rear area. In the future if only we will comprehensively and accurately comprehend Mao Zedong's military thought; analyze, in the spirit of seeking truth from facts, the features and guiding laws of logistics in modern warfare; conscientiously solve the problems in wartime of organizational command, logistics communications and liaison, as well as protection of logistics safety, we will certainly, in a future war of aggression, overcome enemy destruction and blockade, insure the uninterrupted flow of large amounts of materiel to the frontline, and create conditions for winning complete victory in the war.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

NAVAL LOGISTICS CADRES STUDY ECONOMIC READJUSTMENT POLICY

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 17 Jul 79 p 1

[Article by staff correspondent Chen Shungen [3088 7311 2704] et al: "Study To Comprehend the Readjustment Policy and Strengthen Logistics Construction"]

[Text] The party committee of the Naval Logistics Department recently conducted a reading class for divisional and regimental cadres so that the cadres would comprehend in earnest the great significance of the policy of readjustment, restructuring, rectification, and improvement of the national economy, would link the policy to reality, and would discuss and study, based on the spirit of this policy, how to carry out well naval logistics construction.

In the reading class, first of all everybody was led to study the revolutionary teacher's exposition of the economic laws of socialism, the resolution of the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee, and the relevant documents on the national economy, which gave them a clear understanding that beginning this year the goal of the party Central Committee is to carry out the readjustment, restructuring, rectification, and improvement of the national economy over a 3-year period so as to put the national economy gradually on the path of permanent, proportionate, and high-speed development, and that this is the first campaign for realizing the four modernizations.

On the basis of their improved understanding, closely linking up with reality, they also carried out a thorough discussion of the problem of how to build up naval logistics well in the spirit of the national economic readjustment policy. The comrades pointed out that at present, in implementation of the readjustment policy, they should switch the focus of the building up of naval logistics to the modernization of logistics at sea. To this end, they must strengthen logistics supply measures, strive to change the backward ways of supplying forces at sea, and as much as possible adopt advanced techniques. They must also construct well the sea and rear area bases; increase material reserves; reduce the administrative levels of supply; strengthen the comprehensive capacity, transportation capacity, and medical and hygienic capacity; and simplify supply procedures--all these measures will make things more convenient for naval ships and be advantageous for combat preparedness. They must grasp well the logistics supply work of first-line units so that the troops on naval and air bases, in mountains and on islands, have the necessary food, housing, and working facilities. Everybody resolved to grasp this work as of now, and for their own units to formulate practicable plans and strive to carry them out.

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During the discussion the comrades brought up the fact that the members of the study class in departments that manage money and materiel often "give the go-ahead to the outflow and inflow of large amounts of money and materiel." Whether the idea of constructing modernization with thrift and hard work is firmly established in their minds and whether it is embodied well in their actions has a great bearing on naval construction and a very big influence on the workstyle of lower levels and units, and they must certainly play a leading role in putting this idea into practice. The study class also specifically organized a trip to a certain warehouse complex of the Naval Logistics Department for purposes of observation and study. Under the leadership of its party committee, this warehouse complex did not wait for or depend on the four modernizations to regularly undertake the increase of output and savings. Seven of its warehouses have been partially mechanized and automated, thereby saving manpower and materiel, reducing labor intensity, and improving work efficiency. This example was a profound lesson for all members of the class, who indicated that after returning to their own units they would pattern their actions on those of this advanced unit, and in the units of which they are in charge they would make thrift and hard work the order of the day.

The comrades pointed out in the course of their discussion that the logistics cadres, during the construction of the four modernizations, highly value the word "diligence": diligence in studying management and techniques, diligence and conscientiousness in serving the people, and diligence in using their brains to study new problems in absorbing new experiences. This will lead them increasingly to make discoveries and progress in their work, to handle all things with hard work and thrift, to become good "good Red stewards," and to contribute their strength to the construction of modernization in naval logistics.

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ARTILLERY DIVISION TRAINS TOP LOGISTICS CADRES

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by staff correspondents Tian Zongzao [3944 1350 4478] and Ma Shifa [7456 1102 4099] and staff reporter Lei Xinlong [7191 2450 7893]: "Grasp Firmly and Well the Professional Training of Logistics Leading Cadres"]

[Text] The key to improving the organizational command capability of logistics organizations lies in the training of logistics leading cadres. This is the experience in practice summed up by the logistics department of a certain artillery division of the Beijing units. Since the beginning of this year, the department has made the training of logistics leading cadres the focal point of cadre training, grasping it firmly and meticulously, and getting results.

The logistics leading cadres of this division are comparatively new, the majority of them have no experience of actual warfare, and they are comparatively unfamiliar with logistics support work during wartime. This year the divisional logistics department ran two consecutive short training classes for leading cadres at the level of logistics office chiefs and above in which the cadres studied wartime rear services work. The department's methods were:

Based on the characteristics of modern warfare and the actual conditions of the unit, the cadres emphasized the study of basic knowledge necessary to master rear area command during wartime. In the first half of the year, they completed studying four topics: the basic principles and missions of rear services work in an anti-aircraft gun unit, the deployment of rear services supplies according to the commander's operational intentions, and the marking of rear area work charts.

The cadres studied the experiences of actual warfare, deepening their understanding of wartime logistics supply work. They conscientiously read materials pertaining to experience in logistics work during our army's war of resistance against Japan, the liberation war, and the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, and also asked veteran department head Su Wanyuan [4479 8001 0337] to impart to them his experiences in logistics supply work during wartime. In the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, Su Wanyuan's unit took part in the fifth campaign. At that time, when the enemy was conducting large-scale air raids, the logistics leading cadres of this unit, in accordance with the commander's operational intentions, carried out correct organizational command and insured supplies during the battles, forming rear area supply networks that combined

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"transport, attack, repair, supply, and rescue" functions, and powerfully insuring victories in combat at the front. From the experience in logistics supply in this campaign, everybody saw more clearly the decisive role that the organizational command capabilities of leading cadres plays in logistics supply. They also made a point of studying, after the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam, the experience in logistics supply of units that took part in this war, and conducted discussions on the problems of rear area command, ammunition and material supply, first aid for the wounded, vehicle transport, and the control and use of militia in rear areas supporting the front. All the comrades said that modern warfare is a coordinated operation by all military (service) arms and that artillery units act as units attached to other military (service) arms. If logistics leading cadres do not have some knowledge pertaining to combined forces, it will be very difficult for them to rationally deploy and organize the various logistics supply forces. Therefore, in combination with their mission of preparing against war, they acquired general knowledge about the functions of the weapons and equipment, the battle principles, the tactical features, and the logistics supply system of the units an artillery unit would be attached to in a future war.

They researched materials on the logistics supply of foreign armies, learning from the strongpoints of others to make up their own deficiencies. They made some analytical studies of the guiding thought, logistics equipment, maintenance capacity, material transport, POL supply, and battlefield first aid aspects of the Soviet Army's logistics supply work, and extracted from them things they could use. Once, unit commander Ceng Zixi [2582 1311 6007] read in some foreign army materials that every regiment of some countries is equipped with a bakery truck, which is convenient and timely for mess work in wartime. He realized that in a future war against aggression it would be necessary to solve the problem of feeding the troops. Because in wartime anti-aircraft gun units are scattered, are highly mobile, and often engage in combat, there are many difficulties in supplying food to these units, and if we solely depend on the method of burying pots to cook food it will be very difficult to meet the requirements of combat. He led a work team to stay in succession at two "grassroots" regiments, where, together with the cadres and fighters, the team conducted research, pooling the wisdom and efforts of everyone. They refitted the "Liberation-80" towed battle vehicles [tuodouche 2094 2435 6508] into regimental field kitchen trucks, regimental field bakery trucks, and company field bakery trucks, and thus provided experience in changing the traditional method of burying pots to cook food.

They drilled while studying and studied while drilling. When studying the topic of military terrain, the department chief personally led all of the students on an on-the-spot study assignment in the field, and on discovering problems immediately corrected them, so that the students got a fairly good grasp of the basic methods of determining their positions on a map. In a drill carried out not long ago, they selected complex terrain and, with the department chief and the political commissar leading the way in a vehicle, made a night march by map in which they accurately reached their destination. During their realistic drills, they also made a point of summing up the lessons of their experiences and focused on strengthening their study of existing problems. During one drill, the march formation of the logistics supply element [fendui 0433 7130] became disrupted, contact was broken, and it did not reach its assembly area on schedule. Afterward, the leading cadres went to the masses, investigated the reasons for this

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failure, and solicited the masses' opinions, and also convened a special meeting to study the failure. It was decided that the main reason this problem had occurred was that the leading cadres had not clearly and definitely divided up the work and that there was a lack of well-concerted, detailed plans for organizational command. Therefore, they restudied the basic sequence of rear area command.

The logistics leading cadres of this division, in a spirit of responsibility concerning a future war, study assiduously and take the lead in training. From being unfamiliar with wartime logistics supply they have become relatively familiar, from understanding very little they have come to understand quite a lot, and their organizational command capability and their leadership level have both improved. In a comprehensive test on the logistics supply profession held not long ago, the logistics leading cadres throughout the division scored an average of 89 points.

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LOGISTICS CADRES EXHORTED TO IMPROVE PROFICIENCY

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 Sep 79 p 1

[Short commentary: "One Must Have Real Ability and Learning Commensurate With One's Post"]

[Text] That the organizational command capability of a logistics organization depends upon the military accomplishments of its leading cadres is an unarguable truth. When war comes, the way the rear services are carried out is a matter about which the staff and assisting personnel can and should provide situation reports and suggestions, but the final decisionmaking power rests with the leadership. Whether the logistics leading cadres can, based on the determination of the commander of the combined arms force and the actual situation obtaining in the unit, satisfactorily deploy the rear services, is related to whether the logistics supply for the entire battle or campaign can be successfully accomplished. The party committee of the logistics department of a certain artillery division of the Beijing units has seen the importance of this question: he has taken seriously the professional study and training of the department's leading cadres, and has obtained a certain success in this respect.

"Once a person has power, he begins to order people around." When people say this they often do so in a derogatory sense. Actually, when the party or the state gives you power, you are expected to order people around. The problem is that you must issue orders correctly, and must not issue confused orders and not avail yourself of your power of office to seek private gain. To be a leading cadre and not be bold and resolute, not stand up for oneself, and to be irresolute and hesitant when something crops up, are manifestations of a neglect of one's duty. Of course, for a leading cadre to exercise his power of command is not easy. Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out: "A commander's correct deployment originates from correct determination, his correct determination originates from thoughtful and necessary reconnaissance and from pondering the connections between the materials gathered by reconnaissance." Every one of these links is a topic for study: Without a detailed understanding and ample knowledge of actual conditions, it will be difficult to make a correct decision. The logistics supply work in a future war will be wide in scope and highly difficult, and there will be many new situations and problems that we have never encountered. All logistics leading cadres certainly must be adept at learning both to understand our army's combat characteristics, being proficient in the work of the various departments and the professions of the various specialized elements [fendui 0433 7130] of logistics,

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and to have a good idea of the conditions of the enemy army--that is, knowing oneself and knowing the enemy. They can then, on a complex and constantly changing battlefield, have a well-thought-out plan, be calm and unhurried, exercise correct command, and appropriately respond to all sorts of situations.

It should be pointed out that some of our logistics leading cadres still pay little attention to their own professional study and training. They exercise the functions and powers that go with their posts and put their hearts into issuing orders, but they are somewhat lacking in learning and real ability, have only a hazy notion and indistinct picture of the professional work for which they are responsible, and they often issue confused orders. This state of affairs can cause losses to the party work in peacetime and bungle the chances of winning a battle in wartime, when the price for it will be paid in blood. Ma Su, during the Three Kingdoms period, did not encamp his army on an important road but instead quartered his troops in the mountains, where Sima (?Yan) cut off his source of water, so that Ma Su lost his strategic position. Zhao Kuo, of the Warring States period, was only an armchair strategist and could not handle troops in battle, and in the Battle of Changping his line of communications was cut by the Qin army, which in the end led to the destruction of his entire army. We should take a warning from the lessons of the ancients. The party and the people have given us posts and bestowed power upon us; we must strive to possess the commensurate ability and skills. If we do not have real ability and learning and are unworthy of our posts, we should feel ashamed.

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PLA UNIT INFORMATION, DESIGNATIONS

[The following PLA unit number and information are taken from various issues of JIEFANGJUN BAO, published in Beijing. The date in parenthesis refers to date of newspaper report.]

Unit 00065--This unit is engaged in earthwork excavation of a ventilating passage as part of a war preparedness project in an undisclosed area. (2 May 79 p 1)

Unit 00282--A photo shows members of a research lab of this unit carrying out spectrum analysis on rock minerals. (18 Apr 79 p 2)

Unit 32412--This unit is mentioned. (10 May 79 p 4)

Unit 33610--The ordnance personnel of the logistics and repair department of this unit successfully developed a paratrooper target which indicates blank cartridge hits of light weapons. This has resolved problems for infantry units engaged in anti-airborne training. (16 Apr 79 p 3)

Unit 34139--This unit is mentioned. (10 May 79 p 4)

Unit 36021--A technician of this unit developed a terminal for an automatically controlled signal device. (27 Apr 79 p 2)

Unit 37614--The 52d Fendui is mentioned. (10 May 79 p 4)

Unit 39328--The 82d Fendui of this unit wrote a letter to the editor pointing out that the leadership organ is placing too heavy a workload on cadres and fighters. (23 Apr 79 p 2)

Unit 51026--The 6th Company of this unit is mentioned. (9 May 79 p 4)

Unit 51027--A photo caption states that the commanders and fighters of the 3d Antiaircraft Artillery Company of this unit are rigorously carrying out anti-aircraft combat training using existing equipment and in accordance with the characteristics of modern warfare. (2 Apr 79 p 1)

Unit 51036--Proceeding from the needs of a future war, the commanders and fighters of the 1st Tank Battalion of this unit conscientiously carried out a coordinated infantry-tank exercise under atomic warfare condition. (9 May 79 p 1)

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Unit 51041--Fan Hongliang [5400 3163 0081], political instructor of the 8th Company of this unit. (29 May 79 p 2)

Unit 51049--The party committee of this unit is paying attention to the strict running of the ammunition depot. (24 Apr 79 p 2)

Unit 51272--The 69th Fendui is mentioned. (10 May 79 p 4)

Unit 52851--The 1st Artillery Company of this unit is mentioned. (3 May 79 p 3)

Unit 52941--A technician of a signal company of this unit wrote a 30,000-word training manual on radio relay equipment. (18 Apr 79 p 2)

Unit 53836--Commanders and fighters of this unit are shown in a photo rigorously carrying out training to safeguard the four modernizations. (16 Apr 79 p 1)

Unit 54583--This unit is mentioned. (23 Apr 79 p 2)

Unit 54721--A working group of the political department of this unit helped a heavy artillery company of an unidentified regiment and the 2d company of another unidentified regiment to carry out education on the party's policies. (30 May 79 p 1)

Unit 54831--The party committee of this unit issued an order of commendation to 39 cadres at the regimental level for their work in carrying out the four modernizations. (27 Apr 79 p 2)

Unit 56100--This unit is mentioned. (16 Apr 79 p 3)

Unit 81224--The party branch of an 100mm artillery company of this unit helped new fighters who had been transferred from other units make the proper adjustments. (13 Apr 79 p 2)

Unit 81244--The 9th Company of this unit used the heroic deeds of the border units in the self-defense counterattack war as teaching materials to educate cadres and fighters on patriotism. (2 May 79 p 2)

Unit 81257--This unit is mentioned. (23 Apr 79 p 2)

Unit 81658--This unit is mentioned. (23 Apr 79 p 2)

Unit 83024--This unit is mentioned. (30 May 79 p 2)

Unit 83107--The CYL party branch of a warning signal [6226 6639] company of this unit held a democratic election. (30 May 79 p 2)

Unit 83221--This unit is mentioned. (16 Apr 79 p 3)

Unit 83225--The 60th Fendui of this unit is mentioned. (23 Apr 79 p 2)

Unit 83302--This unit is mentioned. (23 Apr 79 p 2)

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Unit 83315--The party committee of a machine gun and artillery company of this unit used the heroic deeds of the Guangxi-Yunnan border units in the self-defense counterattack war as examples to launch ideological-political work to enhance war preparedness training. (9 Apr 79 p 2)

Unit 83435--Wang Yizhong [3769 5030 1813], leader of a telephone communications squad of a command company. (2 May 79 p 2)

Unit 83475--This unit is mentioned. (16 Apr 79 p 3)

Unit 89204--A photo shows three members of the headquarters of this unit operating a Chinese typewriter. (30 May 79 p 2)

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INFORMATION ON MILITARY, OTHER PERSONNEL

[The following biographic information is taken from various issues of JIEFANGJUN BAO, published in Beijing. The date in parenthesis refers to date of newspaper report.]

Chen Zhongsheng [7115 0112 3932] Deputy political commissar of an artillery regiment of Unit 54831. (27 Apr 79 p 2)

Li Erban [2621 0059 2647] Commander of Ship 622. (30 May 79 p 2)

Li Jiulong [2621 0046 7893] Commander of an unidentified division of the Guangxi border units. (8 May 79 p 1)

Liu Shuxian [0491 2579 6343] Chief of staff of an unidentified division of the Beijing Units is shown in a photo studying combat plans together with comrades of an unidentified regiment during an antiairborne training exercise. (9 Apr 79 p 2)

Ma Wensheng [7456 2429 0581] Secretary and political commissar of the party committee of an unidentified regiment of the Shenyang Units. (27 May 79 p 2)

Mei Shaohua [2734 1421 5478] Commander of an unidentified regiment of Unit 54831. (27 Apr 79 p 2)

Wang Junhai [3769 0971 3189] Deputy political commissar of an unidentified artillery regiment. (1 May 79 p 2)

Zhu Xinmin [4281 2450 3046] Commander of an unidentified antiaircraft artillery regiment of Unit 54831. (27 Apr 79 p 2)

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TOP PLA ORGANIZATIONS ISSUE CRITERIA FOR RULES INSPECTION

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Mar 81 p 1

[Article: "The Three General Departments Issue 'Criteria for Inspecting the Implementation of the Common Rules and Decrees'"]

[Text] The [PLA] General Staff Department, General Political Department, and General Logistics Department recently formulated and handed down "criteria for inspecting the implementation of the common rules and decrees [of the armed forces]," calling on the entire army, in accordance with these criteria, to conscientiously organize inspections, promote the implementation of the rules and decrees, strengthen the management of units, and push forward the all-round construction of units.

The "rules and decrees governing discipline," "rules and decrees governing internal affairs," and "rules and decrees governing enlisted men" are the common rules and decrees for all officers and men of our armed forces. Due to the disruption and destruction of the construction of our armed forces caused by Lin Biao and the "gang of four," as well as the influence of anarchist ideology, some comrades are unfamiliar with the rules and decrees. In the past few years, through education and rectification, order has been brought out of chaos, and the work of thoroughly implementing the rules and decrees has greatly progressed. However, there are still many units and militarymen that have an inadequate understanding of the importance of implementing the rules and decrees, and are not serious and conscientious about enforcing them. Some do not follow the rules and go their own way; some do not make strict demands, are not fair in meting out reward and punishment, and relax the organizational discipline among the troops to such an extent that the undesirable tendency to violate laws and discipline is ignored and not controlled, which affects the building of a disciplined workstyle among the troops. In order to change this situation as quickly as possible, the three general departments, in accordance with the demand by the Military Commission of the [CCP] Central Committee to strengthen troop building, and on the basis of widely soliciting the opinions of each large unit and the departments concerned, has formulated and handed down the "criteria for inspecting the implementation of the common rules and decrees [of the armed forces]." The contents of the criteria are: 1) organizational discipline; 2) the relationship between officers and men; 3) the duties of military men; 4) workstyle discipline; 5) enlisted men's training and daily cultivation; 6) daily system and regulations; 7) daily routine cleanup and sanitation tasks; 8) barracks area construction and barracks product management; 9) mess management; 10) management of weapons and equipment, vehicles, army horses,

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bedding and uniforms; 11) duty, guard, and emergency musters; and 12) safety work. The "criteria" lay down clear and specific regulations for all these items. The criteria also lay particular stress on ideological and political education and on the building of a disciplined workstyle among the troops, and call on the officers and men of the entire army to firmly carry out the party's line and its general and specific policies, to carry out consciously and thoroughly the three main rules of discipline and the eight points for attention, to obey management and comply with orders, to unite internally and externally, to maintain a high degree of centralized unification, to establish new socialist habits of stressing civility, being polite, being ethical, and observing discipline, and to consciously resist the influence of nonproletarian ideologies.

The circular in which the "criteria" were handed down calls on each unit to proceed from the reality obtaining among its troops, in line with the spirit of benefiting the strengthening of preparations against war and the convenience of life and of making management easier, to carry out inspections in the spirit of seeking truth from facts, and both affirm successes and point out existing problems, so that the inspections and tests will truly play the role of supervising and urging on the building up of troops.

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FLIGHT SAFETY PRACTICED BY FUZHOU AIRMEN

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Mar 81 p 2

[Article by Wu Tingzhu [0702 1694 2691] et al: "Fuzhou Units Air Force Sets 2-Year Flight Safety Record"]

[Text] On 22 February, the leading comrades of the [PLA] Air Force praised the advanced deed of the Fuzhou units air force in setting a 2-year flight safety record. It was an outstanding achievement to insure flight safety continuously on this large a scale for over 2 years. The safe flying saved the state a great amount of funds and insured the successful completion of the units' combat-readiness training. As of now, all their combat regiments have reached the "A" category level, and the number of pilots capable of flying in the four kinds of weather conditions has doubled compared with the number in 1979.

Three years ago, some flying accidents occurred among the Fuzhou units that affected the building up of the units. The party committee of the Fuzhou units air force, conscientiously summing up the lessons from these accidents, held that the main reason for the serious nature of the accidents was that the training guidance was divorced from the reality obtaining in the units, and confused orders were issued. In order to change this situation, since the beginning of 1979 the committee has mainly taken three measures: First, it has rationally formulated training plans. Adopting the method of proceeding from top to bottom, it allows the division and regiments, in accordance with the intent of the upper echelon, to integrate the plans with their own reality and decide by themselves the training arrangements, with the upper echelon providing help and guidance, thus avoiding taking on what should be done by others and "waging a messy battle." Second, it is guiding the training in the spirit of seeking truth from facts. It has changed the past state of affairs in which the slack and peak periods for flying were automatically divided into the first and last three seasons of the year so that the beginning of the year is a "slack" period, the middle of the year an "intensive" period, and the end of the year a "catchup" period, thus suiting the training content to changing weather conditions. The committee also, proceeding from the actual level of the flyers, both stressed the laying of a good foundation and the organizing of the units vigorously but carefully to surmount difficulties, improve their technical level, and actively maintain safety, so that there has been a considerable improvement in the units' ability to carry out their pursuit mission and to handle special situations. Third, the committee, in accordance with rules and decrees and the training outline, has done good preventive work.

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Based on historical lessons and according to relevant stipulations, it reduced the incidence of duplicative questions; by paying attention to the special features of the topics for study, it took focused measures; and, under favorable conditions, it got a firm grip on unsafe factors, thus obtaining the initiative in safety work.

To prevent the issuance of confused orders, the committee paid a great deal of attention to changing the leadership's workstyle and developed the spirit of doing a thorough job. For the past 2 years and more, the leading comrades of the Fuzhou units air force have regularly gone into the units to make inspections, conduct research, and solve problems. Some comrades, even though they are over 50 years old, still do not fear intense cold or heat and continue to go to the flight line to get the feel of the situation and grasp the practical aspects of the work there. Once, political commissar Zhang Xiyong [1728 1585 1661] went to a certain regiment that was just about to start on five training outlines, and, disregarding his frail physique and painful illness, carried out investigation and research with meticulous care. He led the cadres of the division and the airfield terminal in a careful inspection of the technical state of the runway. They discovered that over 1,000 cement pieces had caved in. He then instructed the unit to immediately repair the runway, thereby insuring flight safety.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

LIAONING TEAMS GIVE COMPANIES BORDER DEFENSE TRAINING

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Mar 81 p 2

[Article by Li Weijun [2621 4850 6511] et al: "Border Defense Companies Helped To Train Well in Basic Skills"]

[Text] On 19 February, a group of cadres, selected from the [Liaoning] provincial military district and the border defense military subdistrict for their experience in border defense training and their strong organizing capability, came to a certain army school, where, together with 100 graduating members of the border defense forces, they took a 26-day concentrated course in teaching methods. Afterward, they were formed into several tens of training and teaching teams and sent to various border defense line companies to help the companies train for 1 year. This was one measure taken by the leadership organizations of the Shenyang units to strengthen the training of border defense companies. These teaching teams focus on teaching the border defense companies how to get a good grip on the principal training topics. They help the companies to solve problems connected with individual soldier and squad defense in training to fire the 40-mm rocket launcher and the 80-mm recoilless rifle, as well as teach the subjects of capturing enemy personnel for intelligence purposes, going on patrols, observing the enemy, posting guards, reconnoitering, and pursuing and capturing enemy personnel, thereby helping the companies in a down-to-earth manner to train well in the basic skills and fostering in the companies "four skills" cadres and backbone elements.

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BRIEFS

'LOGISTICS STUDIES' JOURNAL--In accordance with the Military Commission's directive calling upon the academic research department of the Institute of Logistics to carry out the task of logistics academic research throughout the armed forces, the General Logistics Department and the party committee of the Institute of Logistics have decided to officially publish a monthly journal entitled HOUQIN XUESHU [LOGISTICS STUDIES] which will be distributed to logistics departments above the regimental level throughout the armed forces. LOGISTICS STUDIES is a publication of specialized theories on logistics and mainly contains the following: articles on the study, research and application of Chairman Mao's military thinking and instructions on logistics work; theoretical issues on various specialized logistics research; academic theses studying logistics support in a future war against aggression; our army's historical experiences in logistics work during past revolutionary struggles; selections of foreign armies' logistics academic developments and useful experiences; and our armed forces' fine tradition in logistics work and logistics academic research developments of PLA units and academies. In order to speed up our armed forces' logistics modernization, LOGISTICS STUDIES also introduced some modern logistics scientific and technical know-how which has applications in the field of logistics. [Text] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 18 Apr 79 p 2]

SURGICAL LAMPS ABOARD SHIPS--For surgery in a low and narrow ship cabin, the lighting equipment cannot be too bulky, although sufficient light must be assured; otherwise, it may be a hindrance to the surgical operation and affect its result. After research, a new surgical lamp has been manufactured with the application of a new technology--cold lighting with coated filaments. This lamp can turn 360 degrees and has a tilting angle of 90 degrees. A single lamp can emit 8,000-10,000 lux. The light is low in temperature, soft in color, and easy to operate. It is also sturdily built, and is able to withstand force one tremor and force two shock. It is superior to the present Model CB 384-64 surgical lamps. [Text] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 26 May 79 p 3] 9411

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PARTY AND STATE

DEVISING METHODS TO DEFEAT SUPERIOR FORCE EMPHASIZED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Mar 81 p 2

[Article by staff special commentator: "Bring Forth Methods That Promote Strong Points and Overcome Weak Points"]

[Text] During discussions on how an inferior force can vanquish a superior force, we had to say again and again: Method! Method! Method! Why? Because it is really of the utmost importance in vanquishing a superior force with an inferior force to bring forth methods that promote strong points and overcome weak points.

Only look at history. The burning of warships in the Battle of Chibi, the attachment of knives to long shafts by the Yue Jia army, the stealthy entrance into the enemy's position during the breakout from Jin Wushu's "floating iron seige" and "captured horses," and the use of high-pressure water hoses to break the sand dike line along the canal bank during the Egyptian-Israeli war all show the power in battle of promoting strong points and overcoming weak points, and they all embody problems of devising and applying good strategy and clever tactics. The emergence and application of a good method can often greatly strengthen one's defensive power, add a great deal to one's striking power against the enemy, and raise the combat effectiveness of one's troops, and can even become the turning point in transforming inferiority into superiority or defeat into victory.

Again, look at present reality. In a future war against aggression, many new situations and many new features will emerge, and this poses many new tasks in our training work and forces us to bring forth new methods for subduing the enemy. For example, in conditions in which we are in the strategic defensive stage and have inferior equipment, how are we, in modern conditions, to fight a positional war, a mobile war, or a guerrilla war; in conditions in which we do not have control of the air, how are we to insure troop mobility; when on the offensive, how are we, giving full play to the role of the existing equipment of all service branches, to break through barriers, open routes, and effect a breakthrough; when on the defensive, how are we, with regard to the enemy's "three broadazes", to resist fierce bombing by the enemy's air force, strong surprise attacks by his artillery fire (guided missiles), successive breakthroughs by his massed tanks, and vertical penetration by his airborne forces? If we can bring forth methods for dealing with these problems, then we will be more certain of vanquishing a superior force with an inferior force.

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History and present reality both prove that confidence and methods are linked to each other, complement each other, and that one cannot exist without the other. Without confidence in victory, one cannot talk about war or about victory. Similarly, without methods to secure victory, one also cannot talk about war or about victory. This is the case when a superior force is pitted against an inferior force, and it is even more the case when an inferior force is pitted against a superior force. If an army with inferior equipment pitted against an enemy with superior equipment has confidence in victory but doesn't have the methods in hand to secure that victory, then "the confidence is hollow and the lack of method is real," and it can only "remain in a position of inferiority and grieve" and cannot "vanquish a superior force with an inferior force." If the army has both confidence and methods then it will truly "be in an inferior position and not grieve" and can truly "vanquish a superior force with an inferior force." From this we can see that there is a definite dialectical relationship between confidence and method. Between them they can produce two kinds of cycles: one cycle is good--the more methods the better the situation, and the more confidence the more adequate the situation; the other cycle is bad--the fewer the methods the more mistakes are made, the the less the confidence the more inadequate the situation is. The two kinds of cycles inevitably lead to two kinds of results: one is victory and the other is defeat. In the final analysis, the decisive factor in determining which cycle will be produced is method.

At present this kind of phenomenon is occurring: when the subject of confidence is brought up for discussion, it seems that there is enough confidence to spare, but when the subject of method is brought up for discussion, not even a few methods are forthcoming. What is the reason for this? Originally, some comrades still had not placed the subject of methods on their daily agenda of problems to think about. The main reasons for this were that their thinking was ossified, they did not think of forging ahead, and they had not completely shaken off the fetters of the influence of the two "whatevers" and of metaphysics.

Some comrades are content if the troops have high morale with regard to being victorious over a strong enemy who has superior equipment, and in their hearts believe that "the brave will be victorious." Beyond the shadow of a doubt, our troops are courageous, and the courageous spirit of men is an important factor in being victorious. However, material force can only be destroyed by material force, and the outstanding achievement of vanquishing a superior force with an inferior force can only be accomplished by courageous people employing the method of promoting strong points and overcoming weak points. For even the most courageous people to vanquish a superior force with an inferior force, a reliable method that closely combines people and weapons is necessary.

Some comrades are content just to shout the slogan "vanquish a superior force with an inferior force" and forget about bringing forth methods, as if it were enough to have a correct slogan. To be sure, the slogan "vanquish a superior force with an inferior force" is correct and certainly must be regularly raised and must penetrate into people's minds until it changes the present reality. However, slogans cannot take the place of methods, and strategic slogans cannot function as tactical slogans. We must change the habit of shouting much and doing little. After adopting the correct slogan, the most important thing is to implement it, and the most valuable thing is to put it to use in dealing the concrete matters. We must conscientiously "deal" with "concrete matters" and bring forth methods that promote strong points and overcome weak points.

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Some comrades believe that "when a cart comes to a mountain there will certainly be a road over it." The meaning of this is that once the guns have sounded, there will naturally be methods and it will not be too late at that time to bring them forth. Actually, they are fooling themselves. In the world it is to be feared that there are not many cases in which after "doubting whether there is a road through a complex landscape" then automatically there will appear "another village amid the dense willow trees and bright flowers." With regard to the question of war, which is a matter of life and death for the state, we cannot leave the slightest thing to chance. If we are to vanquish a superior force with an inferior force, we must, by all means and in a down-to-earth fashion, seek methods that promote strong points and overcome weak points.

The bringing forth of methods that promote strong points and overcome weak points is not just the affair of a minority of the people but is the affair of the majority of the people. Good methods must be brought forth both by the "Zhuge Liang's" and by the "cobblers" [a reference to the saying "three cobblers with their wits combined equal Zhuge Liang the mastermind," i.e., two heads are better than one]. If the organization and the companies, the cadres and the fighters, each and every service branch, all get moving and use their brains, they certainly can create superior strategy for promoting strong points and overcoming weak points and bring forth clever schemes for vanquishing a superior force with an inferior force.

The problem is that at present some comrades still do not clearly recognize their own responsibility in this regard. They do not play their conscious dynamic role in creating methods, but wait for higher levels to give them methods and for other people to teach them the methods. In the process of doing research on methods to vanquish a superior force with an inferior force and to promote strong points and overcome weak points, the higher level organizations and the scientific and research departments can and should bring forth some good methods, but they are only "processing factories" and "wholesale departments," and a considerable portion of the "materials" and "goods" should come from the masses' practice. Such being the case, we--the masses, in practice--should synthesize the actuality of training to think about this question, pay attention to it and bring forth methods. If we fighters wait for the cadres, the companies wait for the organization, the small organization waits for the big organization, the ordinary unit waits for the scientific research department, and one level waits for another level, then the methods of promoting strong points and overcoming weak points in the end can only be like the horse looking at a picture of baked cakes in a mirror, i.e., feeding on illusion.

It is up to the masses to think up and bring forth methods. In the Middle Eastern war, the Egyptian army's high-pressure water hoses broke through the Israeli army's sand dikes on the canal bank, thereby solving a big difficulty that neither heavy artillery bombardment nor bulldozers could solve. This tactic cannot be called unmasterful, but this master stroke was not thought up by a general but by an ordinary staff officer.

In May of last year, the training in directly aimed fire against tanks conducted by a certain regiment of the Shenyang units fundamentally achieved laser seriation. This set of seriate laser training equipment was successfully developed by an innovation team led by a leading cadre of the regiment.

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Due to improvements in the packing and wrapping method, the armor-piercing power of the satchel charge used against tanks by a certain regiment, with the same amount of charge as before, increased by 10 times. The person who improved the packing method was not a scientific researcher or a cadre but just an ordinary fighter.

Some units, based on the characteristics of the enemy army's defensive operations and proceeding from the reality of our army, have conscientiously studied, repeatedly practiced, and combined both indigenous and foreign methods in preliminarily probing into and testing a method of opening a route through 400 meters of enemy obstacles, thereby providing experience for future combined research into overcoming such obstacles.

Faced with these facts, comrades who think that they cannot bring forth good methods should change their views. There is nothing they cannot do. If only they have a sense of responsibility, think of "doing" and be willing to "do," then, when seeking methods of vanquishing a superior force with an inferior force and of promoting strong points and overcoming weak points, they will be able to develop their ability to the fullest. If only the intelligence and wisdom of the masses is brought into play, there will certainly be a steady flow of good methods. Of course, at times the methods brought forth by some people, due to limitations in various aspects, may be inadequately perfected and even fundamentally impracticable. However, their responsible spirit of assiduous study is extremely valuable. With this valuable spirit there will be the finest methods. Therefore, we must be adept at bringing into play, developing, and protecting the creative spirit of the masses, fully mobilize the masses, and let both the "Zhuge Liang's" and the "cobblers" pitch into this work in concert, so that there will be a reliable guarantee for bringing forth methods that promote strong points and overcome weak points.

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PARTY AND STATE

PARTY DEMANDS GENUINE, NOT SUPERFICIAL, POLITICAL UNANIMITY

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Mar 81 p 3

[Article by Qi Chengzhang [2058 2052 4545]: "We Must Have Conscious Unanimity and Not Be Satisfied With Superficial Unanimity"]

[Text] When studying how to carry out the spirit of the central work conference, with stress on maintaining political unanimity with the party Central Committee, some comrades worry that their improper remarks will be considered by people as not maintaining unanimity with the central authorities, and so they are unwilling to speak up at party conferences about questions that they obviously do not understand and cannot see the logic of. They think that by just making known their support, regardless of how they really think, they will be regarded as maintaining unanimity with the central authorities. In fact, this kind of superficial unanimity is definitely not true unanimity, and it is definitely detrimental to the correct understanding and implementation of the party's line and its general and specific policies.

Whether one can maintain political unanimity with the central authorities is a question of a Communist Party member's stand and party spirit, and obviously should be dealt with seriously. However, the serious attitude we are talking about means a good grasp of the ideas and a common understanding. Therefore, whether mistakes are committed with regard to this question is not determined by whether one speaks or remains silent, whether one speaks much or little, but rather by how one learns the party's line and its general and specific policies and by whether one's understanding of them is correct or not. If one studies them well and understands them, one's incorrect views will be corrected and one will not commit mistakes; conversely, if one does not speak up but cannot see the logic of the line and policies, then it will be difficult to avoid making mistakes.

To maintain unanimity with the central authorities, there must be organizational obedience, but even more there must be ideological unanimity with the party's line and its general and specific policies. This unanimity must be truly conscious and not superficial or hypocritical. To fail to understand but pretend to understand, to be unwilling to speak what is on one's mind, and to look as if one were maintaining unanimity while in actuality one is far from doing so, is not the attitude of seeking truth from facts that we Communist Party members should have. Our party has millions upon millions of party members, and due to their different levels of understanding and degrees of comprehension and their different positions, it is not surprising and it is permissible for some comrades at times not to understand

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certain general and specific policies of the central authorities or to misunderstand them. We stress the maintenance of unanimity precisely because certain ideas objectively exist that are not in unanimity with the central authorities, and through conscientious and careful work we must seek a common understanding. What we must criticize are those people who do not conscientiously study in order to comprehend the party's directives and documents, but rather find fault as they please and even doubt or oppose them; this definitely does not mean that we do not allow party members to express their ideas and views at party conferences in the spirit of seeking truth from facts, including different opinions and suggestions. Our party's organizational principle is to allow party members to express different opinions within the party and to retain their own opinions. Of course, no matter what views party members themselves have, they all must firmly obey and carry out the party's decisions. This is absolutely necessary organizationally in order to insure the party's centralized unification. Every comrade who sincerely maintains unanimity with the party will be honest and frank with the party, will hold nothing back from the party, and will, through the organization, tell the party what he thinks, being in a state of unanimity with the party Central Committee on what he personally thinks, and of course this is good; if there are things about which he is not in a state of unanimity with the party, then he should conscientiously make comparisons and check on himself, and in study and practice, as quickly as possible unify his ideas with the spirit of the documents of the central authorities. This is the correct attitude of responsibility to the party. To express unanimity on the surface but in one's mind not to understand, to speak insincerely and to cover up one's true thoughts, is of no help in straightening out one's own understanding, is of no help in understanding the situation of the party organization and is of no benefit to the unification of the party's thinking.

We stress the unification of thinking and the maintenance of unanimity with the central authorities in order to eliminate the disruption caused by all kinds of mistaken ideas and to use correct ideas in guiding the practice of the four modernizations, to guide all items of work and unify the actions of the entire party. If we are satisfied with superficial verbal unanimity and with merely repeating what the documents and directives of the central authorities say, only going through the motions of making known our position, then we can only make some superficial observations and cannot conscientiously link up with the reality of our unit and carry out work in a down-to-earth fashion, so as to implement the directives of the central authorities in every unit and every item of work. This kind of phenomenon often appears: Unanimity is talked about but not maintained; at meetings, verbally, and on paper we find the words "maintain unity," but in reality people go their own way. This kind of ideological workstyle, in which one's deeds do not match one's words and in which one thinks one way and acts another, is an indication that the pernicious influence of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" has not been eliminated and it is also an indication that the party spirit is not pure. It only corrupts the party's workstyle in its internal and external relations, damages the party's image in the eyes of the masses, adversely affects the masses' faith in the party's cause, and hinders the thorough implementation of the party's line and its general and specific policies, and it should be resolutely corrected.

With regard to the leaders, when organizing the study of the central authorities' documents, they should be adept in guiding everybody to say what is on their minds,

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and, through active propaganda, guidance and painstaking ideological work, gradually unify the understanding that is not in unanimity with the party so that it becomes unified with the spirit of the central authorities' documents. They cannot simplistically demand that their subordinates make known their position and be content with verbal expressions of unanimity; even less can they slap labels on someone when they hear about some small difference in understanding. Many facts show clearly that without the normal practice of democracy in the party there can be no true centralized unification.

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PARTY AND STATE

UNHEALTHY TENDENCIES IN PARTY MUST BE STAMPED OUT

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Mar 81 p 3

[Article by Li Jingrong [2621 2529 2837]: "The Correct Party Workstyle, and Stability and Unity"]

[Text] "The question of a political party's workstyle is a question of the party's very existence." This statement by Comrade Chen Yun brought before the entire party in a serious fashion the extreme importance of a correct party workstyle, and further conveyed the party Central Committee's unswerving determination to have a good party workstyle. This is a powerful impetus for every one of us Communist Party members, especially the party's leading cadres, conscientiously and thoroughly to implement the "guiding principles."

However, some comrades worry that laying stress on correcting unhealthy tendencies will hinder stability and unity. Is this idea correct? We should make an analysis. The practice of a good party workstyle is fundamentally consistent with the strengthening of stability and unity. Stability and unity are not something we can do without, or something that will automatically be achieved; to achieve them requires a lot of work, and an important part of this is to overcome all negative factors that hinder such stability and unity. The unhealthy tendencies of all kinds that exist within the party and the society constitute one of these negative factors that wreck stability and unity. At present, the broad masses, on the one hand, see that since the smashing of the "gang of four," many fine traditions of our party are being restored; on the other hand, they also see that not a few unhealthy tendencies still exist within the party, with the result that there are many comments and opinions on the subject. In these conditions, to firmly correct the unhealthy tendencies is obviously a necessary measure for promoting stability and unity. Is it better to protect and preserve the unhealthy parts of the party's workstyle? Or is it better to firmly point them out and correct them? The facts prove that it is better to firmly correct them. Our party is one that is responsible to the people, a serious party. We have always advocated the launching of criticism and self-criticism in order to overcome our own shortcomings and mistakes. This is advantageous for cementing the relationship between the party and the masses, for raising the party's prestige in the eyes of the people, and in the final analysis for stability and unity.

Some comrades say that, since everybody has a few unhealthy tendencies which they cannot get rid of, how can stability not be affected? First of all, these comrades

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exaggerate the unhealthy tendencies. The great majority of the members and cadres of our party are good or relatively good. Only a few of them have unhealthy tendencies; the majority of them resist unhealthy tendencies, or have a few unhealthy tendencies that are not difficult to correct. Therefore, for the great number of members and cadres of our party, the main thing is to conscientiously study the "guiding principles," integrating them with reality, improving our understanding of them, and consciously and thoroughly implementing them, and not to require that everybody pass a test on them. With regard to a tiny number of comrades whose unhealthy tendencies are serious and who have committed mistakes, we must carry out serious criticism and treatment. But we also must deal with them in a gentle and mild way, upholding the policy of "curing the sickness to save the patient," and permit and welcome the correction of their mistakes and not harshly attack them. In short, the correction of unhealthy tendencies must be carried out in accordance with the principle of criticism and self-criticism within the party and with the correct policy. In this way, confusion will not be created and stability and unity will not be hindered.

"The spearhead of correcting unhealthy tendencies is directed against the older cadres!" Not so. Older cadres have unhealthy tendencies, and so do middle-aged and younger cadres and the masses. They must all be corrected. The older cadres shoulder the burden of leading the masses of people in the construction of the four modernizations. They have received much education from the party, and they should take the lead in implementing the "guiding principles," take the lead in correcting unhealthy tendencies. In fact, the majority of our older cadres are maintaining the party's glorious traditions and support the opposition to unhealthy tendencies. But there are a small number of older cadres who have forgotten the party's glorious traditions and who use the power of office granted to them by the party and people to seek personal gain and indulge in unhealthy tendencies. Naturally these comrades should be criticized, helped, and educated. The broad masses are reasonable. If these comrades will humbly solicit the opinions of the masses and sincerely correct their unhealthy tendencies, they will obtain the masses' support and the unity between top and bottom will be strengthened.

By speaking in this manner, will the opposition to unhealthy tendencies not hinder stability and unity? This is not the case. We must also see that in society there are still a very few people who sow discord to serve private ends, including some remnants of the "gang of four" factionalist setup. They are the ones who oppose the four basic principles. They frequently take the opportunity presented by the existence of healthy and unhealthy tendencies to stir up dissatisfaction with the party and the older cadres, equating the older cadres with those who have become privileged, and even saying that they are "feudalist roaders," a "privileged stratum," etc, deliberately exaggerating in order to create a situation, in a vain attempt to create disorder, wreck the party's leadership and seize its authority. We must warn these people who harbor ulterior motives that we will in good time lay bare and criticize all their reactionary viewpoints, strengthen the legal system, and let the broad masses clearly see their features. In this way, we will be able, in conditions of stability and unity, through thorough and painstakingly ideological and political work and through conscientious criticism and self-criticism, to gradually overcome the unhealthy tendencies within our party and spur the people of the entire country to build an even better social atmosphere and a highly spiritual socialist civilization.

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PARTY AND STATE

SHENYANG UNITS HOLD CONFERENCE ON FOUR BASIC PRINCIPLES

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 12 Mar 81 p 1

[Article by Gong Ganyang [7895 3058 2799]: "Boldly Carry Out Education in the Four Basic Principles"]

[Text] In the last third of February, at a political work conference held by the Shenyang units, the comrades attending the conference, after thorough discussion, proposed that, in accordance with a Marxist stand, bold and active propaganda and education in the four basic principles be carried out in order to correctly understand these principles and to eliminate the disruption caused by the "left" and the right.

The conference synthesized the conditions on which it was briefed by representatives of eight units and summed up the experiences and lessons gained in the previous phase. Everybody expressed the view that the situation in the units in which education is being launched in the four basic principles and in which the four basic principles are being upheld is very good. However, some units have not been sufficiently bold in this respect and some have lacked persuasive power. To thoroughly carry out propaganda and education in the four basic principles, they must eradicate the influence of the "left" and right mistaken ideologies. For example, when the subject of adhering to the socialist path is raised, some comrades think this means that the more the system of public ownership of the means of production is put into effect, the better; the more equal the distribution, the better; and there are also some comrades whose understanding of the superiority of socialism is inadequate.

When the subject of proletarian dictatorship is raised, some comrades frequently see too many subjects for dictatorship, and some people relax their vigilance with regard to class struggle. When the subject of upholding Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought is raised, some comrades fall back into the habit of the two "whatevers," and there are also some who are slack in studying the fundamental theories of Marxism. When the subject of upholding the party's leadership is raised, some comrades always think of undertaking the whole thing and that what they themselves say is what counts; while there are some comrades whose concept of the party is dim, even to the extent of doubting the party's correct leadership. We cannot turn a blind eye to, or treat lightly, the problem of these obstacles to the education in the four basic principles.

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Taking into account the reality of the units, everybody made concrete analyses of these problems. Dai Xuejiang [2071 1331 3068], director of the political department of a certain army, said that the confusion created by the distortion and falsification of the four basic principles by Lin Biao and the "gang of four" has not yet been thoroughly cleared up. The minds of some of our comrades to this day are still hemmed in by some "left" restrictions. Added to this are their inadequate study and their failure to understand the situation, so that they lack the correct understanding of the four basic principles and thus often regard "leftist" things as correct and regard correct things as rightist. Wang Zhaoying [3769 0340 5391], acting chief of the propaganda office of a certain army, pointed out: Another important reason for this is that their minds lack the dialectical method and so they take a one-sided approach to problems. For example, when the sham socialism of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" is criticized and certain faults in our work are corrected, the faith of some comrades in scientific socialism is shaken. When feudalism is criticized and a display of socialist democracy is advocated, some people ignore centralization and discipline and are influenced by ultrademocracy and bourgeois liberalism. When the idea that the "spirit is omnipotent" is criticized, some people ignore the role of the revolutionary spirit and weaken and slack off in their political and ideological work. Everybody at the conference held that matters of both "left" and right depart from the four basic principles and that we must handle affairs according to the dialectical method and cannot again indulge in metaphysics. Only by straightening out the ideological line and eradicating the disruption caused by the "left" and the right can we correctly understand the four basic principles and boldly carry out propaganda and education in them.

Liao Hansheng [5220 3352 3932], first political commissar of the Shenyang units, in the final speech at the conference, pointed out: The task of top priority in current political work is to concentrate our efforts and expend our energy on the four basic principles, guiding the great number of cadres and fighters to correctly understand and uphold the four basic principles. Therefore, this conference decided to begin now to undertake well three items of work. The first item is to launch throughout the units a reeducation program in the four basic principles, and, closely adhering to the reality of the situating, to eliminate the influence of the "left" and right mistaken ideologies. The second is to stress good rational training for cadres, particularly those at the regimental level and above, conscientiously organizing the study of the fundamental theories of Marxism, measuring oneself in respect of the four basic principles, and summing up experiences and lessons. The third is to closely integrate the education in the four basic principles with the education in the party's general and specific policies. All units that have grasped weakly or studied superficially the general and specific policies since the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee must make up the lessons in good fashion and truly gain a clear idea of what socialism is and what capitalism is, and emphasize improving their understanding of the present agricultural economic policy and the national economic readjustment policy.

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